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When litigants present a court with a dispute over a recently changed election law,
should it handle the case any differently than a dispute over a longstanding election
law? Imagine, for instance, two states. State A has no early voting. State B used to
provide thirty-five days of early voting but has recently cut that period back to
twenty-eight days. A federal court is probably more likely to conclude that State B
has improperly burdened the right to vote.1
Litigants seeking to lift burdens on the right to vote and judges adjudicating these
claims have an unremarkable problem—what is the benchmark for measuring these
burdens? Legal theories abound for claims under the constellation of rights known
as the “right to vote.”2 And when a legislature changes a voting practice or procedure,
courts may have an easy benchmark—they can consider what the right to vote looked
like before and after the enactment of the new law, and they can evaluate a litigant’s
claim on that basis. Recently, federal courts have been relying on this benchmark for
the main causes of action litigants might raise after a new law has been enacted—a
Section 2 challenge under the Voting Rights Act, a freedom of association claim
subject to the Burdick balancing test, and an Equal Protection analysis derived from
Bush v. Gore.3 And frequently, courts have found that new laws that eliminate onceavailable voting practices or procedures fail. 4
I describe this new practice as the Democracy Ratchet. The concept of a judicial
ratchet is hardly a new concept in constitutional law,5 nor is the concept of a
particular rule of interpretation when it comes to election law.6 And one form of
review under the Voting Rights Act, non-retrogression, once functioned as a ratchet. 7
But it is only recently that a convergence of factors have driven courts to (often
unwittingly) adopt the Democracy Ratchet more broadly: the demise of Section 5 of

1. Cf. Samuel Issacharoff, Voter Welfare: An Emerging Rule of Reason in Voting Rights
Law, 92 IND. L.J. 299, 305 (2016) (“Ohio would have had more early-voting days than most
states, and certainly more than my home state of New York, which has none. Can the Ohio
law be legally challenged without also declaring New York’s failure to allow early voting to
be even more unlawful?”).
2. See generally Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About
Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1709–20 (1993) (distinguishing voting as participation,
voting as aggregation, and voting as governance); Daniel P. Tokaji, Voting Is Association, 43
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 763 (2016) (discussing the relationship between the right to vote and the
right of association).
3. See infra Part III.
4. See infra Part I.
5. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Daryl J. Levinson, The Non-Retrogression Principle in
Constitutional Law, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1211 (1998); see also ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, EQUAL
JUSTICE: THE WARREN ERA OF THE SUPREME COURT 65–97 (1971).
6. See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf, Refining the Democracy Canon, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 1051 (2010); Chad Flanders, Election Law Behind a Veil of Ignorance, 64 FLA. L. REV.
1369 (2012); Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69 (2009).
7. See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2012 & Supp. 2016); see also
Jeffries & Levison, supra note 5; infra Section III.A.1.
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the Voting Rights Act, the trend toward raising vote denial claims under Section 2,
the lack of guidance surrounding the Burdick balancing test, the increase of litigation
surrounding election laws generally, partisanship in state legislatures, and many
tweaks to election laws.8
Ratchets operate in one direction and cannot move in the other direction, absent
extraordinary effort.9 The same holds true for many laws concerning voting practices
and procedures. A legislature can expand such opportunities, but courts scrutinize
cutbacks on such opportunities with deep skepticism—deeper than had no such
opportunity ever existed. The ratchet tightens options, squeezing the discretion that
legislatures once had. This Article seeks to solve the puzzle of how courts have
scrutinized, and should scrutinize, legislative changes to election laws.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I identifies recent instances in which
federal courts have invoked a version of the Democracy Ratchet. It identifies the
salient traits of the Democracy Ratchet in these cases. Part II describes why the
Democracy Ratchet has gained attention, primarily as a tactic of litigants and as a
convenient benchmark in preliminary injunction cases. Part III examines the history
of the major federal causes of action concerning election administration—Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act, the Burdick balancing test, and the Equal Protection Clause.
In each, it traces the path of the doctrine to a point where a version of the Democracy
Ratchet might be incorporated into the test. It concludes that these causes of action
do not include a substantive Democracy Ratchet. Part IV turns to determine how the
Democracy Ratchet might be used. It concludes that the Democracy Ratchet is best
identified as an evidentiary device and a readily available remedy for courts
fashioning relief. It then offers suggestions for its appropriate use. Part V identifies
some concerns with existing use of the Democracy Ratchet and instances in which
litigants or courts may incorrectly use the Democracy Ratchet. It offers guidance for
courts handling changes to election laws.
I. THE DEMOCRACY RATCHET IN ACTION
In a handful of cases in recent years, federal courts have faced disputes about a
new election law. The law in question eliminated some portion of a previouslyexisting voting practice or procedure. Litigants sought to strike down the law. And
courts in the cases below invoked a form of the Democracy Ratchet in doing so.
While the merits and details of the specific legal claims raised will be discussed
in Part III, federal courts have used the Democracy Ratchet regardless of the cause
of action—a Voting Rights Act claim under Section 2; 10 a Fourteenth Amendment
claim under the Supreme Court’s balancing test set forth in cases like Anderson v.

8. See infra Part III.
9. A ratchet is distinct from a socket wrench, which performs the functions of a ratchet
but permits movement in another direction with little effort. Handcuffs and subway turnstiles
are two of the most common types of ratchets—they move in a single direction and do not
permit movement in the other direction. There are ways to release a ratchet—the keys to the
handcuffs, for instance, would permit one to move the cuffs in the other direction—but they
require something extra designed to disable the ratchet’s function.
10. See infra Section III.A.
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Celebrezze and Burdick v. Takushi;11 or a Bush v. Gore-style claim for arbitrary
treatment of voters.12
At the outset, it is worth noting that procedural oddities sometimes ultimately
dominate these cases and may limit their precedential value. For instance, some occur
in short-fused litigation, especially on a preliminary injunction standard, and may not
survive in their present form when the case reaches the merits on a permanent
injunction. Appellate courts stayed or vacated other decisions. Nevertheless, they are
emblematic of courts beginning to develop the contours of the legal doctrine. These
courts tend to find that the previously existing legal framework is the baseline for the
“right to vote,” and litigation is viewed through the lens of burdens placed upon that
preexisting constellation.
A. Ohio Early Voting, 2014
Before 2005, Ohio had no early in-person voting, and absentee voting was only
available for individuals who met one of several exceptions.13 In 2005, the legislature
enacted changes to this system.14 It permitted no-excuse early voting and allowed for
early in-person voting at least thirty-five days before the election.15 Because Ohio
voters must register at least thirty days before an election, there was a five-day period
in which a voter could register to vote and cast a ballot on the same day. 16 In 2014,
the legislature enacted a new law with more changes, including moving the first day
of early voting to the day after the close of voter registration, which reduced the
number of days of early voting to twenty-nine.17
In Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a
preliminary injunction that prevented implementation of the new law. 18 It concluded
that the burden on African American, lower-income, and homeless voters was
“significant” under Anderson-Burdick, and that such groups “disproportionately”
used early in-person voting.19 That voters might change their behavior “such that
overall turnout might not be affected ‘is not determinative of the Equal Protection
analysis.’”20
The Sixth Circuit in Husted also construed the disparate treatment analysis in
Bush v. Gore. It concluded that the “motivating principle” of Bush v. Gore was
“instructive,” that “‘[h]aving once granted the right to vote on equal terms’—such as
expanding early voting opportunities—‘the State may not, by later arbitrary and

11. See infra Section III.B.
12. See infra Section III.C.
13. Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 531 (6th Cir. 2014),
vacated, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 524.
19. Id. at 544–45
20. Id. at 541.
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disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of another’—for example, by
making it substantially harder for certain groups to vote than others.”21
Finally, in an analysis under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the court
concluded that a comparison to previously available opportunities was “relevant to
an assessment of whether, under the current system, African Americans have an
equal opportunity to participate in the political process as compared to other
voters.”22 Because black voters disproportionately used the early voting procedures
that had been scaled back, the change to the law ran afoul of Section 2.23
B. Florida Signature Matching, 2016
Before 2004, each county in Florida had different procedures for curing problems
with signatures on vote-by-mail ballots.24 If there was no signature, or if the signature
on the vote-by-mail ballot mismatched the signature on file, counties had procedures
on how to solve this problem. 25 In 2004, Florida enacted a law that required all
counties to reject vote-by-mail ballots that lacked a signature or had a mismatched
signature, with no opportunity to remedy these deficiencies. 26 In 2013, the Florida
legislature amended the law to permit voters to remedy ballots that lacked a
signature, but it did not include opportunities for voters to remedy ballots that had a
mismatched signature.27
A federal district court in 2016 found that the law ran afoul of the Burdick
balancing test.28 It determined that the burden was “severe,” because ballots returned
by mail with a mismatched signature would not be counted without adequate
justification—going so far as to call it “illogical, irrational, and patently bizarre.”29
It concluded that there was “no reason that same procedure cannot be implemented
(rather, re-implemented) for mismatched-signature ballots,” because “prior to 2004 .
. . voters had the ability to cure both mismatched-signature ballots and no-signature
ballots.”30

21. Id. at 542 n.4 (quoting Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000) (per curiam)).
22. Id. at 558.
23. Id. The parties would ultimately settle this litigation, and a subsequent challenge in
Ohio was unsuccessful. Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 629 (6th Cir. 2016)
(emphasizing that states need not “maximize voting convenience”).
24. Fla. Democratic Party v. Detzner, No. 4:16cv607-MW/CAS, 2016 WL 6090943, at
*2 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 16, 2016).
25. Id. at *2–3.
26. Id. at *3.
27. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.68(4)(a) (West 2015). The final vote on House Bill 7013 was
115-1 in the House and 27-13 in the Senate, and the bill became law. CS/HB 7013: Elections,
FLA. SENATE, http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2013/7013/?Tab=VoteHistory [https://
perma.cc/R8P8-XX5X].
28. Detzner, 2016 WL 6090943, at *18–19.
29. Id. at *22.
30. Id. at *25.
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C. Arizona Ballot Harvesting, 2016
In 2016, Arizona enacted a law that generally precluded individuals from
collecting early ballots from voters. 31 The statute authorized exceptions to this
general rule, such as “election officials, mail carriers, [and] family members.”32
Arizona permitted a variety of early voting opportunities and allowed early ballots
to be deposited at any polling place on Election Day. 33 This law, however, trimmed
back the practice of “ballot harvesting,” which the Arizona Democratic Party had
used extensively since at least 2002.34 After a district court35 and the Ninth Circuit 36
upheld the law, the Ninth Circuit en banc would have enjoined the law as running
afoul of the Burdick balancing test and the Voting Rights Act.
The en banc court adopted a finding by the dissenting judge in the previous case
that the law placed a “substantial” burden on voters in urban and rural areas,
particularly in places that lacked home mail delivery and reliable transportation. 37
The dissent weighed that burden against the “weak” interest in preventing voter
fraud, where specific instances of illegal ballot collection, which had previously been
permitted in Arizona, were nonexistent.38 In particular, the dissent found that “a
substantial number of minority voters used ballot collection as their means of
voting,”39 a reflection of reliance on the past practice:
[W]hen 80% of the electorate uses early absentee voting as the method
by which they cast their ballots, the method has transcended convenience
and has become instead a practical necessity. Thus, when severe burdens
are placed on this form of voting, it has a significant impact on elections
and the right to vote.40
The dissent also found that the regulation would have run afoul of Section 2, as
the harm disproportionately fell on minority voters and the “totality of the
circumstances” established that plaintiffs would win on a Section 2 challenge. 41

31. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-1005 (2017); see Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s
Office, 840 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir.), reh’g granted en banc, 841 F.3d 791 (9th Cir.), injunction
pending appeal granted, 843 F.3d 366 (9th Cir. 2016), stay granted, 137 S. Ct. 446 (2016).
32. Feldman, 840 F.3d at 1063.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1064.
35. Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office, 208 F. Supp. 3d 1074 (D. Ariz. 2016).
36. Feldman, 840 F.3d at 1086.
37. Id. at 1088–90 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting), adopted en banc, 843 F.3d 366 (9th Cir.
2016), stay granted, 137 S. Ct. 446 (2016).
38. Feldman, 840 F.3d at 1089–90 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 1088.
40. Id. at 1089.
41. Id. at 1096–97.
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D. Michigan Straight-Ticket Voting, 2016
Michigan had a practice of “straight-ticket” voting since 1891.42 The practice
permitted voters to cast a vote for all nominees of a particular political party for all
offices on the ballot with a single mark. 43 The Sixth Circuit applied the Burdick
balancing test and concluded that the burden placed upon voters because of the
elimination of straight-ticket voting was moderate. That burden was found moderate
because wait times would increase, African American voters would be
disproportionately affected, and voters could be confused because of a change to the
ballot marking system.44 The state lacked sufficient justifications for the law.45
The court also concluded that the law ran afoul of Section 2 because African
American voters disproportionately used straight-ticket voting, and that the burden
was linked to historical conditions regarding African American voters.46
E. Examining the Democracy Ratchet
These courts all took similar approaches in approaching the changes to election
laws. They each share four hallmarks of what I would identify as the Democracy
Ratchet.
First, a state changed an election law in such a way that it eliminated a previously
available voting practice or procedure (sometimes, a practice or procedure of recent
vintage). Ohio eliminated six days of early voting that had only been available for a
couple of election cycles. Florida prohibited signature correction for mismatched or
absence of signature, and later permitted signature correction for absence of signature
only. Arizona limited ballot harvesting. Michigan ended the practice of straightticket voting.47
Second, in the ensuing litigation, under whichever federal cause of action the case
arises under, the new law was compared against the preexisting benchmark of the
old law. In each case, courts and litigants examined the availability and use of
previous voting opportunities that no longer existed.
Third, the court expressed heightened skepticism, explicit or implicit, as a result
of the change, sometimes presuming that the right to vote has been burdened in some
way. A stronger version of the Democracy Ratchet would call for a high evidentiary
showing from the new law’s proponents before the law could take effect; a weaker
version would require less. In each case, courts found the state’s justification for the
change wanting—because the states’ justification was relatively weak, the burden on
voters was relatively heavy, or both.
Fourth, the court is more likely to restore the old practice or procedure as a result
of its heightened skepticism. In each of these cases, the courts restored the old
practice (at times, subject to appeal or a hearing on the merits).

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Mich. State A. Philip Randolph Instit. v. Johnson, 833 F.3d 656, 660 (6th Cir. 2016).
Id.
Id. at 662–69.
Id. at 666.
Id. at 666–69.
See supra Section I.A–D.
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F. Resistance to the Democracy Ratchet
It would be an overstatement to say that the Democracy Ratchet exists with full
force across jurisdictions or that it has been consistently applied. In 2004, for
instance, Florida enacted a law that permitted up to fourteen days of early voting,
including the Sunday before Election Day. 48 In 2011, it enacted a law that reduced
the total number of early voting days to eight, permitting up to ninety-six hours of
early voting (the same as the old law), and abolishing voting the Sunday before
Election Day, among other changes.49 At the time, five counties in Florida were
subject to preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 50 In 2012, the
Attorney General revealed that he would not object—the five counties would offer
ninety-six hours of early voting, the same as was available under the old law, and the
new law was precleared.51 Plaintiffs then challenged the law under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act.52 Examining whether the law would “result[] in a denial or
abridgment of the right . . . to vote,” the court recognized that it would not conduct a
retrogression analysis.53 Instead, it would conduct a “practical evaluation of the ‘past
and present reality.’”54
It is worth noting that the Democracy Ratchet, at least in its present form, has only
been used in cases affecting the right to vote. It has not (yet) been used in the broader
set of election law-related cases.55

48. Brown v. Detzner, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1239 (M.D. Fla. 2012).
49. Id. at 1239.
50. Id. at 1241–42.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1243.
53. Id. at 1249–51 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2012) (current version at 52 U.S.C. §
10301 (2012 & Supp. 2017)).
54. Id. at 1251 (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 45 (1986)).
55. Consider campaign finance laws. When a state reduces the amount of money that
individuals may contribute to political campaigns, courts do not require the state to justify the
change in the contribution limits. Instead, courts examine whether the limits, in their present
form, are appropriately tailored. Lair v. Motl, 873 F.3d 1170, 1181 n.6 (9th Cir. 2017) (“At
oral argument, the plaintiffs contended Montana must justify the change between the pre-1994
limits and today’s limits. Every contribution limit case of which we are aware, however,
evaluates the current limits, and the plaintiffs point to no authority suggesting otherwise. In
Randall, for example, the Court evaluated Vermont’s existing limits without discussing
whether the change from Vermont’s previous regime was justified.” (citing Randall v. Sorrell,
548 U.S. 230, 237 (2006) (emphasis in original)); see also Thompson v. Dauphinais, 217 F.
Supp. 3d 1023 (D. Alaska 2017), appeal filed, Thompson v. Hebdon, No. 17-35019 (9th Cir.
filed Jan. 10, 2017) (upholding new lower contribution limits without comparing to benchmark
of old limits); Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 189 (2d Cir. 2011) (upholding new lower
contribution limits without comparing to benchmark of old limits) (“[T]hey argue that these
initial limits have been successful, so that lower limits are unnecessary. This determination,
however, is a matter of policy better suited for the legislature . . . .”). But cf. Ala. Democratic
Conf. v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 838 F.3d 1057, 1070 (11th Cir. 2016) (suggesting that question of
whether plaintiff could sufficiently participate in political dialogue may turn in part upon
evidence of plaintiff’s behavior “prior to the ban” on political action committee transfers).
This might be a reason to call this the “Voting Rights Ratchet,” or something narrower, but
it’s still a device that might be extended to other election law-related cases in the future.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEMOCRACY RATCHET
Some courts have independently moved toward adopting a version of the
Democracy Ratchet—even if their decisions are not always affirmed on appeal. A
handful of factors may be driving courts toward the Democracy Ratchet.
A. Litigants Attacking New Laws
One reason that courts may be using the Democracy Ratchet is because litigants
are using the Democracy Ratchet. Courts, after all, do not decide election law cases
sua sponte. They only consider cases and controversies presented to them.
Of course, legal doctrines like Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Burdick
balancing test apply to all election laws, including laws that have long been on the
books. But in recent years, litigants have lacked success in challenging long-existing
laws. Consider felon disenfranchisement laws. Many of these statutes have been on
the books for decades. And many have persuasively shown that these statutes
disproportionately disenfranchise racial minorities and those from lower
socioeconomic classes.56 But courts have consistently rejected challenges to such
laws, primarily because felon disenfranchisement laws have a sufficiently historical
pedigree.57
The historic pedigree of such laws has hardly been sufficient justification in ballot
access disputes under the Burdick balancing test.58 Indeed, laws that have been on

56. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right
to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92
GEO. L.J. 259, 261–62 (2004); George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment:
Reflections on the Racial Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1899–1900 (1999); Janai
S. Nelson, The Causal Context of Disparate Vote Denial, 54 B.C. L. REV. 579, 603–04 (2013);
Franita Tolson, What Is Abridgment?: A Critique of Two Section Twos, 67 ALA. L. REV. 433,
440 n.26 (2015); see also Derek T. Muller, Invisible Federalism and the Electoral College, 44
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1237, 1280–81 n.268 (2012) (addressing the possibility that Congress could
invoke its power under the Reconstruction Amendments to legislate in the area of felon
disenfranchisement due to its disparate impact on racial minorities); Richard M. Re &
Christopher M. Re, Voting and Vice: Criminal Disenfranchisement and the Reconstruction
Amendments, 121 YALE L.J. 1584 (2012).
57. See, e.g., Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (rejecting claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment due in part to “the historical and judicial interpretation of the
Amendment’s applicability to state laws disenfranchising felons”); Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623
F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (rejecting claim under Section 2); Simmons v. Galvin, 575
F.3d 24, 34 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding that felon disenfranchisement laws could not violate
Section 2 because they “are deeply rooted in our history, in our laws, and in our Constitution”);
cf. Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding that Congress intended not to
address felon disenfranchisement when it enacted and amended Section 2); Johnson v.
Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (concluding once again, that
Congress intended not to address felon disenfranchisement when it enacted and amended
Section 2).
58. See infra Section III.B.
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the books for decades and have yielded few minor party candidacies are among the
ripest targets.59
But plaintiffs, understandably, choose to marshal their resources as effectively as
possible.60 Litigants, therefore, are inclined to choose the ripest targets for victory.
New legislation presents unique opportunities for plaintiffs, particularly for
organizations who have vocally opposed the new legislation in the media and have a
chance to stake out opposition in court. An easy benchmark, then, is to compare the
new law to the old law. These are precisely the types of claims litigants have brought.
Aggressive litigant skepticism of new election laws has, in turn, put courts in a
skeptical posture of new election laws.
Additionally, these older cases emphasizing the historical pedigree of election
laws work in favor of courts implementing a Democracy Ratchet. Under the older
cases, the long historical pedigree of laws, such as those causing felon
disenfranchisement, was a thumb on the scale against a finding that they violated
Section 2 or the Reconstruction Amendments. Under the newer cases, then, recent
changes to election laws would require a thumb on the scale in favor of a judicial
finding that the recent changes are legally problematic.61 Historical practice is not
simply background research; it dictates which way the court’s inclinations ought to
lean.62
Unfortunately for courts, new legislation also means they must speculate about
the future impact that a new law might have. It’s not truly a ripeness issue—the law
has been enacted, and it will take effect in the upcoming election. Instead, it is a
matter of assessing whether the state legislature had the authority to promulgate such
a law based on the potential impact it might have. Too significant an impact, and the
law cannot take effect. But litigants, of course, do not want to wait an election
cycle—much less multiple election cycles—for additional evidence. The evidentiary
issue is another problem for courts.
B. The Preliminary Injunction Standard
Litigants challenging new election laws typically seek injunctive relief. 63 They
also request a preliminary injunction, a remedy with a framework hospitable to the
application of the Democracy Ratchet.

59. See infra Section III.B.
60. Cf. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The South After Shelby County, 2013 SUP. CT. REV.
55, 71 (2013) (explaining that “private parties will need to make difficult choices as to which
policies they will challenge” after the demise of Section 5).
61. Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 869 (E.D. Wis.) (“This reasoning [concerning a
‘long history’ of a voting practice] obviously does not apply to voter photo identification
requirements, which are a recent phenomenon.”), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014).
62. Isaacharoff, supra note 1, at 319–20 (identifying historical consideration as a factor
courts use in evaluating the validity of changes to election laws).
63. The cases described in Part I are typical of litigants who seek to prevent a law from
taking effect. Indeed, Congress created three-judge district courts in certain election law cases
in anticipation of injunctive relief. See Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court
in Voting Rights Litigation, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 91–92 (1996).
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Generally, a preliminary injunction is designed to protect the plaintiff from
“irreparable injury” before the court is able to render a decision after hearing the
merits of the claim.64 The Supreme Court has explained that a party seeking a
preliminary injunction must “establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that
he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the
balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”65
The preliminary injunction has also been described as necessary to preserve the
status quo. The Supreme Court has articulated that the purpose of the preliminary
injunction “is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on
the merits can be held.”66 This description is not without criticism67 and has had an
uneven application in federal courts. 68 Nevertheless, the preservation of the status
quo was one factor the Ninth Circuit cited in the Arizona ballot harvesting case, 69
and the Sixth Circuit in the straight-ticket voting case.70
In cases like these, the Democracy Ratchet serves to return the parties to the status
quo before the new law was enacted, and specifically, to the legal opportunities of
voters under the old regime. Given the uncertainty of weighing the future in these
cases,71 the Democracy Ratchet offers a convenient benchmark lacking in other
contexts.
The status quo, however, has traditionally been a way a court can ensure that it
retains jurisdiction through a trial on the merits. That way, the plaintiff can continue
to seek relief without the risk that the defendant may harm a legally protected interest
such that the district court cannot fashion relief. 72 In election law litigation, that

64. See generally 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE,
RICHARD L. MARCUS, A. BENJAMIN SPENCER & ADAM N. STEINMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2947 (3d ed. 2018) (discussing Rule 65(a) and “the procedure on an application
for a preliminary injunction”).
65. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); accord Trump v. Int’l
Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2017) (per curiam).
66. Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981).
67. See, e.g., John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 525, 546 (1978) (“The status quo shibboleth cannot be justified as a way to limit
interlocutory judicial meddling, because a court interferes just as much when it orders the
status quo preserved as when it changes it.”).
68. Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
109 (2001) (identifying split of authority in federal courts as to the relevance of preserving the
“status quo”); see also James Powers, Note, A Status Quo Bias: Behavioral Economics and
the Federal Preliminary Injunction Standard, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1027 (2014).
69. Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y. of State’s Office, 843 F.3d 366, 368–69 (9th Cir.) stay
granted, 137 S. Ct. 446 (2016) (“Here, the injunction preserves the status quo prior to the
recent legislative action in H.B. 2023. . . . So, the injunction in this case does not involve any
disruption to Arizona’s long standing election procedures. To the contrary, it restores the status
quo ante to the disruption created by the Arizona legislature that is affecting this election cycle
for the first time.” (emphasis in original)).
70. Mich. State A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Johnson, 833 F.3d 656, 669 (6th Cir. 2016)
(“Of particular significance here, the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction
maintained the status quo in Michigan that was in place for 125 years . . . .”).
71. See infra Section IV.A.
72. See supra Section II.B.
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justification may not be as persuasive. For instance, the Purcell principle stands for
the proposition that courts should avoid changing the enforcement of election laws—
suspending their enforcement or reinstituting them—shortly before an election.73 The
Court there explained that “just weeks before an election,” the “issuance or
nonissuance of an injunction” in cases “affecting elections” could cause “voter
confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.” 74 It has
counseled against changes to the status quo, whether in the issuance or nonissuance
of an injunction.75
While the Democracy Ratchet might lean toward constraining the power of the
legislature, the Purcell principle might permit such laws to take effect, at least for
one election, when courts lack sufficient time to address the merits of a claim before
the election. The Democracy Ratchet would traditionally favor a plaintiff seeking to
maintain the status quo, but Purcell looks to maintain the status quo as it currently
exists for voters to avoid uncertainty. The status quo, then, is a less persuasive reason
for the Democracy Ratchet—at least as long as Purcell remains good (if
undertheorized)76 law from the Supreme Court.
And this can only partially explain its use. While courts might cite a form of the
Democracy Ratchet to justify preserving the status quo, they are also citing it when
considering the underlying likelihood of the merits.77 The preliminary injunction
standard may help explain the rise of the Democracy Ratchet—but only in part.
III. REJECTING A SUBSTANTIVE DEMOCRACY RATCHET
These are reasons why the Democracy Ratchet has gained some attention—driven
by litigants to preserve the status quo. But does the law compel such a result? Recall
that courts and litigants employ the Democracy Ratchet regardless of the substantive
legal theory advanced in the underlying litigation—it transcends any particular cause
of action.78
Litigants who go to federal court to challenge a law affecting voting rights have a
variety of legal claims at their disposal. Three of the more popular routes to challenge
a law are a Voting Rights Act claim, a freedom of association claim under the
Burdick balancing test, and an Equal Protection claim after Bush v. Gore. Each claim
has its own winding history. This Part examines each in turn and concludes that none
of these legal theories includes the Democracy Ratchet as a part of its substantive
legal framework.

73. Richard L. Hasen, Reining in the Purcell Principle, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 427, 428
(2016).
74. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006).
75. See Hasen, supra note 73, at 447–56 (collecting cases from Ohio, North Carolina,
Wisconsin, and Texas).
76. See id. at 428.
77. See supra Part I.
78. See supra Part I.
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A. The Voting Rights Act
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to protect the right to vote,
particularly in jurisdictions in the South that had subjected minority voters to
suppression tactics, which yielded substantial disparities between white and black
voter registration and turnout.79 Understanding the current framework for
adjudicating claims under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act begins with an
understanding of Section 5, and of the Voting Rights Act generally. Through this
history is a story of the Democracy Ratchet in Voting Rights Act litigation, including
its demise and its subsequent reintroduction.
1. The Demise of Section 5
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act to “banish the blight of racial
discrimination in voting,” in the words of the Supreme Court in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach.80 Among other things, Sections 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act
established a preclearance regime for proposed changes to certain states’ voting laws:
Section 4(b) created a formula for coverage, and Section 5 created the remedy. 81
States and other political subdivisions would be subject to preclearance from the
Department of Justice (or a federal court) for election laws if they were identified as
a “covered” jurisdiction; no election law could take effect without prior approval
from the Department of Justice.82
In 1965, covered jurisdictions had used a prohibited test or device (often a literacy
test) and had less than fifty percent voter registration in November 1964 or less than
fifty percent voter turnout in that year’s presidential election. 83 The requirements of
the Act mostly captured Southern states, including Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana,
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia.84
The preclearance regime was originally designed to expire after five years, but
Congress renewed it repeatedly, most recently in 2006 and it is set to expire in 2031.85
Congress included more jurisdictions subject to coverage in 1970 based on
benchmarks in November 1968, and in 1975 based on benchmarks in November
1972.86 But the coverage formula was not wholly static.87 A covered jurisdiction

79. Portions of this Section have been adapted from Derek T. Muller, Judicial Review of
Congressional Power Before and After Shelby County v. Holder, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 287
(2013) [hereinafter Muller, Judicial Review].
80. 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
81. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 438 (codified at 52 U.S.C. §§
10303(b), 10304 (2012 & Supp. 2017)).
82. Id.
83. 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b) (2012 & Supp. 2017).
84. Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www
.justice.gov/crt/section-4-voting-rights-act
[https://perma.cc/MFG7-FD4T]
[hereinafter
Section 4].
85. Pub. L. 109-246, 120 Stat. 580 (codified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10102 (2012 & Supp.
2017)).
86. Section 4, supra note 84.
87. See Justin Levitt, Section 5 as Simulacrum, YALE L.J. ONLINE (2013), http://www.yale
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could petition for “bailout” under the Act, so that individual jurisdictions could move
out from under the coverage formula if they had established that preclearance was
unnecessary.88 And a political jurisdiction could be subject to “bail-in,” facing a kind
of judicially supervised preclearance if a federal court found that the jurisdiction
acted with intentional racial discrimination.89
While Section 5 originally may have plausibly been interpreted to extend a
preclearance requirement only to changes in voter qualifications or the manner of
elections,90 the Supreme Court interpreted Section 5 broadly. It included essentially
all election-related laws as subject to preclearance—to cite a few, changes
concerning single-member and at-large districts, write-in ballots, and independent
candidacies;91 changes to polling locations and boundary lines;92 and reorganization
of voting districts and the creation of multimember districts to replace single-member
districts.93 Given the sheer breadth of Section 5, there were over half a million
election-related changes in covered jurisdictions,94 but there have been a “trivial
number of objections” from the Department of Justice concerning these changes,
particularly since the 1982 renewal. 95
For a new law to pass scrutiny under Section 5, the jurisdiction bears the burden
of proving that the law does not have a discriminatory purpose or a discriminatory
effect.96 The Supreme Court construed this provision as a doctrine of “nonretrogression,” asking whether a change to voting procedures “would lead to a
retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective
exercise of the electoral franchise.” 97 Non-retrogression offered a fairly clear
benchmark: changes to the law should be compared against the previous state of the
law. But it offered its own weaknesses as a limited test for those who believed that
Section 5 might extend to more than just non-retrogression.98
Section 5, of course, only extended to covered jurisdictions. And in 2013, the
Supreme Court in Shelby County v. Holder concluded that the coverage formula,
which had not been legislatively updated since 1975, was unconstitutional. 99 That

lawjournal.org/forum/section-5-as-simulacrum [https://perma.cc/5ZE8-AMHN].
88. See 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a) (2012 & Supp. 2017).
89. See 52 U.S.C. § 10302 (2012 & Supp. 2017).
90. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 582–94 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
91. See id. at 550–55.
92. See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
93. See Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
94. Section 5 Changes by Type and Year, DEP’T JUST. (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www
.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/changes.php [https://perma.cc/FX7P-87KU] (identifying
549,302 changes received by the Department of Justice through 2013).
95. Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew Preclearance Provisions, in THE
FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 91 (David L. Epstein et al. eds., 2006).
96. 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2012 & Supp. 2017).
97. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
98. Cf. Jeffries & Levinson, supra note 5, at 1214–15 (“As used in the Voting Rights Act,
non-retrogression is admittedly incomplete and perhaps unwise, but it cannot be condemned
as irrational.”).
99. 570 U.S. 529, 549 (2013); see generally Muller, Judicial Review, supra note 79, at
307–13. The scope of the Court’s holding of Section 4(b) in relation to other provisions of the
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left litigants who sought to challenge election laws scrambling to fill the void left by
Shelby County. In addition, litigants sought opportunities to challenge election laws
in jurisdictions that had not been covered by Section 5.
2. The Rise of Section 2
Following the demise of Section 5, proposals arose for a more robust use of
Section 2.100 Indeed, even before Shelby County, Professor Dan Tokaji was an early
proponent of using Section 2 for “new” vote denial claims—the kind of laws that
burden voting practices or procedures in the form of “nuts and bolts” election laws—
with a two-part test101: “(1) that the practice challenged results in the disproportionate
denial of minority votes (i.e., that it has a disparate impact on minority voters); and
(2) that this disparate impact is traceable to the challenged practice’s interaction with
social and historical conditions.”102 The burden would then shift to the state to justify
that the practice is “narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest”; and that
slight or de minimis burdens might be justified with something greater than mere
rationality.103
The contemporary version of Section 2 begins with the Supreme Court’s voting
rights jurisprudence under the Reconstruction Amendments. Until 1982, Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act largely mirrored the guarantees of the Fifteenth
Amendment104 and was ultimately treated as having “an effect no different from that
of the Fifteenth Amendment itself.”105
In 1973, the Supreme Court in White v. Regester found that plaintiffs could
successfully challenge a state redistricting plan under the Equal Protection Clause,

Voting Rights Act apart from Section 5 is uncertain. See Cody Gray, Savior Through
Severance: A Litigation-Based Response to Shelby County v. Holder, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 49, 68–71 (2015); Eric Licthblau, Why the Justice Dept. Will Have Far Fewer Watchdogs
in Polling Places, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/25/us
/politics/why-the-justice-dept-will-have-far-fewer-watchdogs-in-polling-places.html [https://
perma.cc/3LQ4-THQP].
100. See Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act After Shelby County, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2143 (2015); Michael J. Pitts,
Rescuing Retrogression, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 741 (2016); Stephanopoulos, supra note 60,
at 106–18.
101. Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting
Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 690 (2006) [hereinafter Tokaji, New Vote Denial]. Professor
Tokaji later updated this proposal as a three-part test. See infra notes 145–147 and
accompanying text.
102. Tokaji, New Vote Denial, supra note 101, at 724.
103. Id. at 725–26.
104. Compare U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude.”), with Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 2, Pub. L. 89110, 79 Stat. 437 (“No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”).
105. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61 (1980).
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even without a finding of discriminatory intent. 106 But in 1980, in City of Mobile v.
Bolden, a plurality of the Court found that the Fifteenth Amendment covers laws
“only if motivated by a discriminatory purpose.” 107 It concluded that White v.
Regester was consistent with the need to find a “discriminatory purpose” for striking
down a law.108 And because Section 2 added nothing to the Fifteenth Amendment,
the plaintiff’s claim failed there too.109
Significantly, Congress’s 1982 amendments to the Act codified a results test,
which specified that intent was not required, a response to Supreme Court
precedent.110 The amended text of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides:
A violation . . . is established if, based on the totality of circumstances,
it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election
in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation
by members of a [protected class] in that its members have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice.111
Congress specifically cited White v. Regester as the source of this results test to
overturn City of Mobile and bring Section 2 jurisprudence back to its earlier
standing.112 Thus, “[t]he ‘right’ question . . . is whether ‘as a result of the challenged
practice or structure plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the
political processes and to elect candidates of their choice.’” 113 But the renewed
results test itself was not abundantly clear:114 which circumstances should courts
consider in the “totality,” by what standard should courts view the circumstances,
and what did it mean for an electoral arrangement to result in members of a racial
group having less of an opportunity to participate in the political process? 115
Courts would adopt the “Senate factors” to evaluate the “totality of the
circumstances.”116 The factors derive from the Senate Judiciary Committee’s

106. 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973) (requiring plaintiffs to show that political processes “were
not equally open to participation by the group in question—that its members had less
opportunity”).
107. 446 U.S. at 61–62, 69 (plurality opinion) (quoting White, 412 U.S. at 765) (“The Court
stated the constitutional question in White to be whether the ‘multimember districts [were]
being used invidiously . . . .’” (emphasis in original)).
108. Id. at 68–70.
109. See id.
110. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2012 & Supp. 2017).
111. Id.
112. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes,
Unconstitutional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 377, 387 (2012)
[hereinafter Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2].
113. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44 (1986) (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28
(1982)).
114. One court called it “exceptionally vague.” Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2,
supra note 112, at 387 (citing Goosby v. Town Bd. of Hempstead, 180 F.3d 476, 500 (2d Cir.
1999) (Leval, J., concurring)).
115. See Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2, supra note 112, at 387–88.
116. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43 n.7, 46.
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majority report on the 1982 amendments to Section 2, with reference to the Supreme
Court precedent. The factors include:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political
subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to
register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large
election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or
other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for
discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority
group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political
subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education,
employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively
in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle
racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to
public office in the jurisdiction. 117
According to the Senate Report, courts should consider two other factors of
“probative value”: whether “there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part
of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group,”
and whether the justification for the election practice or procedure is “tenuous.” 118
Professor Ellen Katz identified what might qualify as a tenth factor, a proportionality
analysis in redistricting cases.119
In the vote dilution context, the Supreme Court adopted a three-prong test in
Thornburg v. Gingles.120 Vote dilution claims arise when minority voters allege that
their votes have been diluted in a multimember district or at-large voting system, or
because existing district lines dilute their votes across districts. The Court explained,
“[t]he essence of a [Section] 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or
structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the
[voting] opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred

117. S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982).
118. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37.
119. Ellen Katz, Margaret Aisenbrey, Anna Baldwin, Emma Cheuse & Anna Weisbrodt,
Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 643, 730–32 (2006).
120. 478 U.S. at 50–51.
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representatives.”121 The Court ratified consideration of the Senate Report factors, but
it refined the judicial analysis for vote dilution claims.122
To succeed, claimants must demonstrate three things. First, the voters challenging
the district must be “sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a
majority”; second, the minority voters must be “politically cohesive”; third, the
group must demonstrate that the “white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable
it—in the absence of special circumstances . . . usually to defeat the minority’s
preferred candidate.”123 If they can demonstrate these things, the jurisdiction must
establish a district in which those minority voters constitute a majority of the voting
age population.124 Vote dilution claims under Gingles have been fairly wellestablished in the last few decades of redistricting, albeit not without controversy that
Gingles went too far or failed to go far enough.125
Vote denial claims, however, are another matter. Litigants rarely raised vote
denial claims before Shelby County v. Holder, and these claims are still rarely
successful.126 But federal appellate courts quickly adopted a two-prong test for vote
denial claims under Section 2. To quote one typical judicial holding from 2014:
We read the text of Section 2 and the limited relevant case law as
requiring proof of two elements for a vote denial claim. First, as the text
of Section 2(b) indicates, the challenged “standard, practice, or
procedure” must impose a discriminatory burden on members of a
protected class, meaning that members of the protected class “have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” Second, the
Supreme Court has indicated that that burden must in part be caused by
or linked to “social and historical conditions” that have or currently
produce discrimination against members of the protected class. In
assessing both elements, courts should consider “the totality of
circumstances.”127
Federal courts rapidly adopted this two-part articulation of the test.128 But the
devil is in the details of the “totality of the circumstances.” The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
and Ninth Circuits have been inclined to adopt the Gingles factors to determine the

121. Id. at 47.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 49–51.
124. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
125. Compare ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTE COUNTS?: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS (1987), with Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and RaceConscious Districting: A Case of the Emperor’s Clothes, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1589 (1993).
126. See Katz et al., supra note 119.
127. Ohio State Conf. of NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 554 (6th Cir.) (citations
omitted), stayed, 135 S. Ct. 42, vacated, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014).
128. See, e.g., League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 240 (4th
Cir. 2014); cf. Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office, 843 F.3d 366 (9th Cir.), stay granted,
137 S. Ct. 446 (2016); Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016); Frank v. Walker 768
F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014).
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effect of a law in the vote denial context.129 The Seventh Circuit, in contrast, has been
“skeptical” of using the Gingles factors.130 Nonetheless, courts had adapted some
version of Section 2 jurisprudence to examine under the “totality of the
circumstances” whether members of a protected class have “less opportunity” 131 than
others.
3. Distinguishing Section 2 and Section 5
Even though Section 2 and Section 5 are both parts of the Voting Rights Act, they
have significantly different procedural and substantive differences. 132 The Supreme
Court has been careful not to conflate Section 2 and Section 5. In its first Reno v.
Bossier Parish School Board decision, the Court held that Section 5’s nonretrogression standard was distinct from Section 2. 133 Preclearance should not be
denied simply because of a violation of Section 2.134 Non-retrogression compares the
“benchmark” of the previous plan to the new practice; there is no such benchmark
needed to succeed under Section 2.135
The Court has also distinguished Section 2 and Section 5 to suggest that nonretrogression is exclusive to Section 5—at least, the Court so suggested in vote
dilution cases. In Holder v. Hall, the Court explained, benchmarks to evaluate
Section 5 claims are easy: “We require preclearance of changes in size under § 5,
because in a § 5 case the question of an alternative benchmark never arises—the
benchmark is simply the former practice employed by the jurisdiction seeking
approval of a change.”136 “The baseline for comparison is present by definition; it is
the existing status.”137 “Retrogression is not the inquiry in § 2 dilution cases.”138 And
the Court cited Congress in this respect: “Plaintiffs could not establish a Section 2
violation merely by showing that a challenged reapportionment or annexation, for
example, involved a retrogressive effect on the political strength of a minority
group.”139 In a Section 2 challenge to the size of a government body, “[t]here is no
principled reason why one size should be picked over another as the benchmark for
comparison.”140
Other courts have followed suit, refusing to import non-retrogression into Section
2.141 Indeed, sometimes plaintiffs have prevailed on a Section 2 claim on a law that

129. See supra note 128.
130. Frank, 768 F.3d at 755.
131. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2012 & Supp. 2016).
132. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 60, at 64–118.
133. 520 U.S. 471, 480 (1997).
134. See id.
135. Id. at 478.
136. 512 U.S. 874, 888 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 883 (plurality opinion).
138. Id. at 884 (emphasis added).
139. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 97–417, at 68 n.224 (1982), as reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177).
140. Id. at 881.
141. See, e.g., Metts v. Murphy, 363 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding that “plaintiffs
cannot prevail merely by showing that an alternative plan gives them a greater opportunity to
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had been precleared.142 At other times, however, courts have read a Section 5 gloss
into Section 2 claims,143 sometimes implicitly.144
4. Section 2 and the Democracy Ratchet
The demise of Section 5 and new litigation surrounding vote denial claims
launched not just attention on Section 2, but attention focused on how to treat
changes to laws. That is, when the legislature eliminates a previously available
voting practice or procedure, how should a court scrutinize the new law?
Professor Tokaji’s approach to Section 2 vote denial claims is a three-part test that
resembles, in part, the judicial test:
(1) Plaintiffs must show that the challenged standard, practice, or
procedure causes a disproportionate burden on members of a
protected class that an alternative standard, practice, or procedure
would avoid.
(2) Plaintiffs must show that the disproportionate burden is traceable to
interaction of the challenged standard, practice, or procedure with
“social and historical conditions” that have produced or currently
produce discrimination against members of the protected class.
(3) If the plaintiffs satisfy (1) and (2) then the defendants must show by
clear and convincing evidence that the burden on voting is
outweighed by the state interests in the challenged standard,
practice, or procedure.145
When it comes to changes in laws, Professor Tokaji explains, “context matters a
great deal.”146 Courts ought to examine “how the practice fits in (or does not fit in)
with the body of election rules and practices in the state.”147
As for changes to election laws, Professor Tokaji recommends that “the relevant
question is whether the challenged practice has a disparate impact on racial

win the election,” for doing so would “convert section 2’s all-circumstances test into the far
more stringent ‘anti-retrogression’ test of section 5”).
142. See, e.g., Miss. State Chapter, Operation Push v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D.
Miss. 1987).
143. See, e.g., Brown v. Dean, 555 F. Supp. 502 (D.R.I. 1982) (citing a Section 5 case,
Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971), when evaluating a Section 2 claim concerning a
change of voting precinct).
144. See Spirit Lake Tribe v. Benson County, No. 2:10-CV-095, 2010 WL 4226614
(D.N.D. Oct. 21, 2010) (finding on preliminary injunction standard that elimination of two
polling places that served Native American voters likely violated Section 2, even with
expansive mail-in voting options, based on polling evidence of likelihood of voting and based
on tribal transience and distrust of postal services that made mail-in voting insufficient; but
rejecting that finding for a third polling place).
145. Daniel P. Tokaji, Applying Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 439, 474 (2015) [hereinafter Tokaji, Applying Section 2].
146. Id. at 483.
147. Id.
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minorities relative to other voters that could be avoided by some other practice.”148
If the practice affects white voters and minority voters in the same way, there is no
disproportionate burden.149
Professor Pamela Karlan has suggested that changes to voting laws should
properly be considered a “burden” in a Section 2 claim—“[g]iving evidentiary
weight to the existence of a change does not impermissibly import the retrogression
standard of section 5 into section 2.”150 She persuasively argues that a racially
disproportionate effect “cannot be necessary to establishing a section 2 violation,” in
part because turnout data is unavailable until after the election, and that relief must
be available before the election.151 She argues that “abridgment” may include any
practice with “‘less’ (and not ‘no’) opportunity to participate equally.”152 Where
voters “disproportionately” use a particular mechanism, such as voting on Sundays,
cutbacks on that mechanisms will, “as a practical matter, disproportionately burden
or abridge” the right to vote.153 “Abridgement” includes “overcoming new or
different burdens.”154 To survive a Section 2 claim, a jurisdiction would need to
demonstrate that it would have adopted the change to the voting law “in the absence
of any political consequences,” which is likely “impossible” in most cases.155
Professor Michael Pitts has proposed “rescuing retrogression” by offering an
“additional layer” to the Section 2 test to specifically handle a “newly adopted
law.”156 A law with a retrogressive effect would “presumptively” violate Section 2,
and the burden shifts to the government “to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the retrogression in order to avoid section 2 liability.” 157
5. Section 2 Resists a Substantive Ratchet
The text of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not necessarily support
implementing the Democracy Ratchet—at least not in its stronger forms.
To start, the text of Section 2 contains succinct language that ought to begin. A
voting practice is forbidden if it is “not equally open to participation” so that
members have “less opportunity than other members . . . to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice.”158 It’s worth noting that this
statutory language has been modified through some judicial interpretations in cases
adopting the Democracy Ratchet. In the Ninth Circuit decision considering Arizona’s

148. Id. at 478 (emphasis in original).
149. Id.
150. Pamela S. Karlan, Turnout, Tenuousness, and Getting Results in Section 2 Vote Denial
Claims, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 763, 768 (2016) [hereinafter Karlan, Getting Results].
151. Id. at 771 (emphasis in original).
152. Id. at 773.
153. Id. at 773–74.
154. Id. at 774.
155. Id. at 788.
156. Pitts, supra note 100, at 750–51; see also Ruby J. Garrett, Comment, A Call for
Prophylactic Measure to Save “Souls to the Polls”: Importing a Retrogression Analysis in §
2 of the Voting Rights Act, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 633 (2015).
157. Pitts, supra note 100, at 751.
158. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2012 & Supp. 2017).

472

I N DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 94:451

ban on ballot harvesting, for instance, the court noted that the law places “a
disproportionate burden on the voting opportunities of members of the Tohono
O’odham tribe in comparison with the population of white voters.”159 The statutory
language “less opportunity . . . to participate . . . and to elect” became
“disproportionate burden on the voting opportunities” in the Ninth Circuit’s
holding.160
There is a risk in cases like these of over-reading the statute to conclude that any
facially neutral practice that any group has ever used runs afoul of the language of
Section 2.161 But perhaps that overstates the claim. It’s not that the voting practice or
procedure has ever been used by a racial group. It’s that, as Professor Karlan notes,
the practice or procedure—say, early voting or Sunday voting—has been
“disproportionately” used by (in this case) black voters, and that a cutback on the
practice or procedure would “disproportionately” burden black voters. 162 That is,
overcoming “new or different burdens” would qualify as “less opportunity.” 163 But
even here, the Court’s consistent rejection of importing a non-retrogression standard
from Section 5 into Section 2 makes the introduction of the Democracy Ratchet
problematic. And there is a constitutional concern too: if Section 2 is construed too
broadly, it might exceed Congress’s powers under the Reconstruction
Amendments.164
Put another way, the text of the statute requires “less opportunity”—not “fewer
opportunities.”165 The simple fact that voters have benefited from a mechanism in
the past, and that mechanism no longer exists, cannot be enough. “Less opportunity”
in the context of vote dilution includes a finding that the majority racial voting block
votes “usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.”166 Likewise, elimination
of a voting mechanism—or the lack of a voting mechanism in a non-Democracy
Ratchet context—that would work to “usually” defeat the minority’s ability “to
participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice” might
rise to the level of a Section 2 violation. 167 The abolition of a voting opportunity
alone is not enough to assert “less opportunity.”
Importing non-retrogression into Section 2 would also exacerbate the problem for
states trying to justify election laws. With Section 5 preclearance, jurisdictions would
go to the Department of Justice or a three-judge panel, with a fairly settled

159. Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office, 843 F.3d 366, 402–03 (9th Cir. 2016).
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 628–30 (6th Cir. 2016);
Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 754 (7th Cir. 2014).
162. Karlan, Getting Results, supra note 150, at 770–71.
163. Id. at 774.
164. See, e.g., Michael T. Morley, Prophylactic Redistricting? Congress’s Section 5 Power
and the New Equal Protection Right to Vote, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2053, 2059–62 (2018)
(considering the validity of Section 2 under the Reconstruction Amendments’ Enforcement
Clauses); Pitts, supra note 100, at 758 n.84. See generally Muller, Judicial Review, supra note
79 (discussing litigation surrounding the Voting Rights Act).
165. See infra notes 315–316 and accompanying text.
166. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 31 (1986); see supra notes 120–125 and
accompanying text.
167. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43, 49–51.
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expectation of what they needed to demonstrate out of the legislative process. 168
Reading non-retrogression into Section 2, however, the parties would head directly
to court, before a single district court judge, with an ordinary litigation posture but
an expectation that the defendant carries a heavier burden than has typically been
required under Section 2 claims.
Rethinking how Section 2 claims ought to look, then, there must necessarily be a
“gap” left by the demise of Section 5. Some practices that constituted “retrogression”
under Section 5 cannot constitute “less opportunity” under Section 2; otherwise,
Section 2 would, at the very least, be coextensive with Section 5, and even broader
given its national application. That would not only render Section 5 historically
superfluous—an anachronistic take at best—but also contradict existing Court
precedent on how to construe Section 2 differently from Section 5. It’s essentially
the reverse of Reno v. Bossier: just as Section 2 standards cannot be imported into
Section 5, Section 5 standards cannot be imported into Section 2.169
So what kinds of practices might fail the non-retrogression standard but still pass
muster under Section 2? It could be the case that this gap is somewhat narrow, or at
least apparently narrow given the posture of the cases courts see. It may be that
litigants are challenging the most egregious laws (but perhaps out of a preference for
challenging the laws they consider, and perhaps subjectively, to be the most
egregious—particularly statewide laws). It might be that more modest changes, some
of which may have failed Section 5—the closing of certain polling place locations,
for instance, unless the jurisdiction affirmatively demonstrated that the change would
not have a retrogressive impact—are not so dramatic and have not garnered much
attention from litigants.
Recent proposals to use Section 2 to address changes to election laws are best
when they avoid the peril of reading retrogression back into the statute. Changes to
election laws remain a relevant part of the inquiry, but their relevance arises as a
matter of evidence that can be introduced to demonstrate that minority voters have
“less opportunity” than others. Put differently, the Democracy Ratchet is not a
substantive component of Section 2. It is simply a means of demonstrating that, under
the “totality of the circumstances,” the plaintiffs may win under Section 2—an
evidentiary claim.170
In contract, one suggests that incorporating the Democracy Ratchet into Section
2 itself would provide this portion of the Voting Rights Act with a consistent standard
operating within this broader legal framework. The legal standard is fairly openended: “less opportunity,” for example, is hardly a term of precision. Courts, then,
might look at the overall purpose of the statute in question and evaluate changes to
election laws given a broader statutory framework. For instance, Professor Karlan
has noted that because the Voting Rights Act is designed to ensure broad
opportunities for voters to take advantage of election procedures and practices, the
statute ought to be applied so that it best achieves these ends.171 The Democracy
Ratchet would be one such tool to achieve those ends.

168.
169.
170.
171.

See supra Section III.A.1 (describing preclearance regime under Section 5).
See supra Section III.A.3.
See infra Section IV.A.
Karlan, Getting Results, supra note 150, at 771–72.
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But this interpretation risks smuggling a Section 5 non-retrogression analysis back
into the statute, something flatly forbidden.172 Furthermore, such an interpretation
may overstate the “opportunities” available to voters under the status quo, inflate the
burden placed upon them, and understate the costs of changing the law. 173 The
Democracy Ratchet may still play a role, but simply an evidentiary or remedial
role—separate from the substantive elements of a Voting Rights Act claim. 174
6. Revisiting the Development of the Democracy Ratchet
Finally, to return to the descriptive claim from earlier: why has the Democracy
Ratchet attracted such attention in Section 2 claims? Undoubtedly, litigants question
new election laws and challenge them in court, and courts have become skeptical of
new election laws.175 Indeed, after Shelby County, it simply became easier for states
to change their election laws—and many did so, to the consternation of those who
endorsed a robust Section 5.176 After all, that was precisely what states could do.
Commentators skeptical of Shelby County sought alternative ways to preserve the
essential elements of Section 5 through not simply Section 2177 but existing law178 or
new legislation.179 For supporters of Section 5 who lamented the Court’s decision in
Shelby County, filling the gap left after Shelby County has been an understandably
natural focus. But Shelby County still controls, and there is no preclearance under
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act at the moment. Until Congress acts, it is simply
the case that changes to election laws receive no kind of heighted judicial scrutiny
under the Voting Rights Act. Section 2 does not demand it, no matter how much
litigants and supporters of Section 5 may desire it.
B. The Burdick Balancing Test
Another major way for litigants to challenge election laws is under a test
commonly known as the Burdick balancing test. It derives from a series of cases

172. See supra Section III.A.3.
173. See supra note 161 and accompanying text; infra Section V.A.
174. See infra Section IV.A.
175. See supra Section II.A.
176. See, e.g., Tomas Lopez, ‘Shelby County’: One Year Later, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(June 24, 2014), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/shelby-county-one-year-later [https://
perma.cc/L9PR-FHSN] (identifying string of changes to election laws after Shelby County).
177. See supra Section III.A.3.
178. See, e.g., Anthony J. Gaughan, Has the South Changed? Shelby County and the
Expansion of the Voter ID Battlefield, 19 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 109 (2014); Stephanopoulos,
supra note 60, at 71; Michael Ellement, Precelarance Without Statutory Change: Bail-In Suits
Post-Shelby County, YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA (Sept. 7, 2013, 11:45 AM), https://
ylpr.yale.edu/inter_alia/preclearance-without-statutory-change-bail-suits-post-shelby-county
[https://perma.cc/SU8D-NCAA].
179. See, e.g., James Blacksher & Lani Guinier, Free at Last: Rejecting Equal Sovereignty
and Restoring the Constitutional Right to Vote: Shelby County v. Holder, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 39 (2014); Samuel Issacharoff, Comment, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting,
127 HARV. L. REV. 95 (2013); Spencer Overton, Voting Rights Disclosure, 127 HARV. L. REV.
F. 19 (2013).

2019]

THE DE M O CRA C Y RA T CH ET

475

involving the freedom of voters and candidates to associate with one another by
means of the ballot.
1. Voting and Association
The First Amendment includes no express guarantee of the “freedom of
association.”180 But in 1958, the Court examined an attempt by the Alabama Attorney
General to force the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) to disclose its membership list.181 The Court concluded that the right
asserted by members of the NAACP was a freedom of association: “It is beyond
debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas
is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”182 By choosing to root
the freedom of association in the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment,183
the Court acknowledged “the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and
assembly.”184
The Court wasted no time in introducing the doctrine into ballot access disputes.
By the 1960s, the Court had already begun to inject itself into traditionally stateadministered areas of election law.185 And ten years after NAACP v. Alabama, the
Supreme Court found that the state-administered ballot included an associational
right.186 In 1968, the Court examined a challenge to Ohio’s ballot access law.187 Ohio
required presidential candidates nominated by new parties to secure voter-signed
petitions totaling at least fifteen percent of the ballots cast in the previous
gubernatorial election.188 Republican and Democratic candidates qualified for ballot
space if their parties secured just ten percent.189 In its decision in Williams v. Rhodes,
the Court identified “two different, although overlapping, kinds of rights—the right
of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of

180. Some portions of this subsection have been adapted from Derek T. Muller, Ballot
Speech, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 693 (2016).
181. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 451 (1958).
182. Id. at 460.
183. Id.
184. Id. This freedom would eventually be identified more clearly by the Supreme Court
as a component of the First Amendment. See JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE
FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 82–96 (2012) (discussing the evolution of the freedom of
association after NAACP).
185. See, e.g., Derek T. Muller, Perpetuating “One Person, One Vote” Errors, 39 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 371, 375–78 (2016) [hereinafter Muller, One Person, One Vote] (discussing
federal courts’ use of the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate state election laws); Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., The Presidential Election Dispute, the Political Question Doctrine, and the
Fourteenth Amendment: A Reply to Professors Krent and Shane, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 603,
607–08 (2001) (discussing how the Court has found election disputes to be justiciable).
186. See generally Tokaji, Voting Is Association, supra note 2 (discussing the relationship
between the First Amendment associational right and the Fourteenth Amendment right to
vote).
187. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
188. Id. at 24–25.
189. Id. at 25–26.
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qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes
effectively.”190
Even if a candidate did not appear on the ballot, the Court acknowledged that
individuals could associate for political purposes in the public sphere.191 They could
organize a political party, they could hold meetings, and they could assemble in
public places or private homes.192 But the Court did not limit the guarantee of
association to these previously enumerated opportunities to engage in political
speech. Alternative avenues of engagement existed, but they were insufficient.
Instead, the Court extended the guarantee to include a right to associate in a particular
forum: the ballot.193 The Court explained, “[t]he right to form a party for the
advancement of political goals means little if a party can be kept off the election
ballot and thus denied an equal opportunity to win votes.”194 This right of association
is not effective enough unless it applies to the ballot, because alternative means of
association are not enough.195 The right to cast an effective or meaningful ballot,
then, is also an element of the freedom of association.196
Like most other rights secured by the Constitution, the right of voters to associate
with candidates on the ballot is not absolute. Circumstances may permit the state to
regulate the ballot to burden individuals’ right to associate. In Rhodes, the Court
found that there were “unequal burdens on minority groups where rights of this kind
are at stake,” which meant that a burden-imposing state must proffer “a compelling
state interest.”197 Ohio failed to justify the burden.198 Its proffered interests in
burdening minor parties—promoting the stability of the two-party system, ensuring
that winners earn a majority of the vote, and the like—were legitimate interests, but

190. Id. at 30 (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S 449, 460 (1958)) (“We
have repeatedly held that freedom of association is protected by the First Amendment.”); see
INAZU, supra note 184, at 82–96.
191. Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 30.
192. See id. at 60 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Many election law cases continue to refer to
these as Equal Protection claims. See, e.g., infra notes 205–207 and accompanying text.
193. Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 32.
194. Id. at 31.
195. Accord Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 192 (1999); Nader
v. Blackwell, 545 F.3d 459, 472 (6th Cir. 2008); Moore v. Johnson, No. 14-11903, 2014 WL
4924409, at *4 (E.D. Mich. May 23, 2014); cf. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (1988)
(“That appellees remain free to employ other means to disseminate their ideas does not take
their speech through petition circulators outside the bounds of First Amendment protection.
Colorado’s prohibition of paid petition circulators restricts access to the most effective,
fundamental, and perhaps economical avenue of political discourse, direct one-on-one
communication. That it leaves open ‘more burdensome’ avenues of communication, does not
relieve its burden on First Amendment expression.”).
196. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787–88 (1983); Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 30–
31; Rosen v. Brown, 970 F.2d 169, 176 (6th Cir. 1992).
197. Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 31 (“[T]he right to vote is heavily burdened if that vote may be
cast only for one of two parties at a time when other parties are clamoring for a place on the
ballot.”).
198. Id.
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they were not enough.199 The State could not “justify the very severe restrictions on
voting and associational rights,” and its defense failed.200
The Court considered a ballot access law again, three years later, in Jenness v.
Fortson.201 There, a Georgia law permitted ballot access for an independent
candidate if the candidate had a petition signed by at least five percent of registered
voters.202 Political parties whose candidates received at least twenty percent of the
vote would automatically qualify for ballot access.203
So far as the Georgia election laws [were] concerned, independent
candidates and members of small or newly formed political organizations
[were] wholly free to associate, to proselytize, to speak, to write, and to
organize campaigns for any school of thought they wish[ed]. They may
[have chosen to] confine themselves to an appeal for write-in votes. Or
they [might have sought], over a six months’ period, the signatures of
5% of the eligible electorate . . . . If they [chose] the latter course, the
[path to ballot access was open to them].204
The Court concluded that “nothing” in this system “abridges the rights of free speech
and association secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”205 Then it
rejected a claim under the Equal Protection Clause.206
Since Rhodes and Jenness, the Court’s opinions have emphasized the voters’
rights to associate with candidates—voters’ rights to associate for political ends or
to choose among candidates.207 The Court’s examinations turn primarily on rights of

199. Id. at 31–34.
200. Id. at 32.
201. 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
202. Id. at 432.
203. Id. at 433.
204. Id. at 438.
205. Id. at 440.
206. Id. at 440–42.
207. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786 (1983) (“Our primary concern
is with the tendency of ballot access restrictions ‘to limit the field of candidates from which
voters might choose.’ Therefore, ‘[i]n approaching candidate restrictions, it is essential to
examine in a realistic light the extent and nature of their impact on voters.’”) (quoting Bullock
v. Carter, 405 U.S 134, 143 (1972)); Communist Party of Ind. v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441,
449 (1974) (rejecting loyalty oath for political party because it interfered with the party’s
candidates, and burdened voters’ “access to the ballot, rights of association in the political
party of one’s choice, interests in casting an effective vote and in running for office”); Kusper
v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 51 (1973) (finding that a twenty-three month prohibition on voting
in a primary election of a political party if the voter previously voted in another party’s primary
“unconstitutionally infringes upon the right of free political association protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments”); see also Anderson, 460 U.S. at 806 (“We began our inquiry
by noting that our primary concern is not the interest of candidate Anderson, but rather, the
interests of the voters who chose to associate together to express their support for Anderson’s
candidacy and the views he espoused.”). The Equal Protection line of cases, in which the Court
examines whether the ballot access rules for similarly situated candidates are available on
equal terms, does not put the same emphasis on the voters’ rights. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin
Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 357–58 (1997).
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voters to associate with these candidates and cast a ballot for the candidate of their
choice.208
2. Balancing Tests
These early ballot access disputes ultimately led the Court to develop the
balancing test that dominates election administration litigation today. A leading case
in the area is Anderson v. Celebrezze.209 There, the Court scrutinized an Ohio law
that required independent candidates running for president to file a nomination
petition and statement of candidacy the March before the November election.210 The
Court determined that the appropriate test required “weighing” a series of factors.211
These included the “character and magnitude” of the injury to the constitutional
rights at issue, the interests of the state in creating the burdens that impact those
constitutional rights, and the extent to which the burdens are necessary to achieve the
state’s interests.212 It then concluded that the March filing deadline did not further
the state’s proffered interests: educating voters, treating parties equally, and political
stability.213
In Burdick v. Takushi, the Supreme Court examined a challenge to Hawaii’s writein candidate prohibition.214 It articulated a fuller explanation of the Anderson
balancing test as follows:
A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh
“the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to
vindicate” against “the precise interests put forward by the State as
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into
consideration “the extent to which those interests make it necessary to
burden the plaintiff’s rights.”
Under this standard, the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety
of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged
regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Thus, as we
have recognized when those rights are subjected to “severe” restrictions,

208. See, e.g., Anderson, 460 U.S. at 792 (“It is clear, then, that the March filing deadline
places a particular burden on an identifiable segment of Ohio’s independent-minded voters.”);
Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 965 (1982) (“The Court has recognized, however, that
such requirements may burden First Amendment interests in ensuring freedom of association,
as these requirements classify on the basis of a candidate’s association with particular political
parties. Consequently, the State may not act to maintain the ‘status quo’ by making it virtually
impossible for any but the two major parties to achieve ballot positions for their candidates.”);
see also Rosen v. Brown, 970 F.2d 169, 175 (6th Cir. 1992) (“The primary concern in any
ballot access case is not the interests of the candidate but of the voters who support the
candidate and the views espoused by the candidate.”).
209. 460 U.S. at 780.
210. Id. at 782–83.
211. Id. at 789.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 796–806.
214. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
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the regulation must be “narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of
compelling importance.” But when a state election law provision
imposes only “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” upon the First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, “the State’s important
regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify” the restrictions.215
Restated, a court must identify the “character and magnitude” of the injury based
on the state’s proffered “precise interests” and the “extent” of the “burden” on the
plaintiff.216 In practice, after an examination of the facts, the court tends to make a
rather conclusory statement about the nature of the injury. A court’s characterization
of the character and magnitude of the law—as “severe” or “reasonable [and]
nondiscriminatory”—triggers the level of appropriate scrutiny.217 “Severe” burdens
must be “narrowly drawn” to achieve a “compelling interest.”218 But a “reasonable
[and] nondiscriminatory” burden “generally” survives judicial scrutiny pursuant to
the state’s “important regulatory interests.”219
Burdick involved a challenge to Hawaii’s ban on counting write-in votes.220 The
Court concluded that “any” burden imposed was a “very limited” one because
candidates had ample opportunities to obtain ballot access.221 That meant Hawaii’s
law easily passed constitutional scrutiny.222
But Burdick would offer a framework that could be applied to far more election
law situations than ballot access disputes. It is, admittedly, an ad hoc and open-ended
test.223 And it would extend to election administration cases more generally. The
ballot access disputes in Anderson and Burdick would offer a kind of safety valve for
federal courts to scrutinize state election laws. And the introduction of the Burdick
framework into “nuts and bolts” election administration cases has not proved as
smooth.
In Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, the Supreme Court considered a
challenge to Indiana’s voter identification law and used the Burdick balancing test.224

215. Id. at 434 (citations omitted).
216. “‘Character’ references the type of burden the State places on voters . . . . ‘Magnitude’
references the severity of the State’s burden on voters.” Michael J. Gabrail, Misapplication:
The Rush to Equal Protection and How the Lower Courts Have Misapplied the “Character and
Magnitude” Analysis to Equal Protection Claims Against Election Law 6 (unpublished
manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
217. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND.
L. REV. 89, 97 (2014).
220. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 428.
221. Id. at 435–37.
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., Michael T. Morley, Remedial Equilibration and the Right to Vote Under
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 279, 282–83, 297 (2015)
(arguing that the Anderson-Burdick test is too subjective and ad hoc and recommending a more
objective approach to identifying violations of the right to vote rooted in Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
224. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality opinion).
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The plurality characterized the law as “a limited burden on voters’ rights”225 and the
concurrence described it as a “generally applicable, nondiscriminatory voting
regulation.”226 Unsurprisingly, then, Indiana’s law was justified by at least three
“legitimate” interests: modernizing elections, preventing voter fraud, and
safeguarding voter confidence.227
The “balancing” test often functions as a simple binary formula. If the burden is
severe, it must pass strict scrutiny; if the burden is slight, it must pass something like
rational basis scrutiny.228 As a relatively binary formula, it often yields a binary
result: if the legislative burden is severe, it is usually deemed a violation of the right
to associate; if it is not severe, the regulation is typically upheld.229
Often, but not always. Crawford offered at least two major opportunities for
increased judicial scrutiny of such laws. First, the Crawford three-Justice plurality
suggested that the proper measure for evaluating the burden of election laws should
be to examine the burden placed upon the affected group.230 In Crawford, that meant
examining the “small number of voters” who may experience a “special burden.” 231
The record demonstrated no “‘excessively burdensome requirements’ on any class
of voters.”232 Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment with two other Justices and
argued that the Court precedent demanded that the Justices examine a “generally
applicable, nondiscriminatory voting regulation” from the perspective of “voters
generally,” not a particularized group of voters.233
Second, the Crawford plurality offered not so much a binary formula, but a
“flexible standard” that required some evaluation of the nature of the burden.234
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment to dispute this claim, arguing that a “twotrack” approach was appropriate and more consistent with the Court’s precedents.235

225. Id. at 202–03 (plurality opinion) (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 439).
226. Id. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring).
227. Id. at 191–97 (plurality opinion).
228. See id. at 204–06 (Scalia, J., concurring).
229. See, e.g., Franita Tolson, Protecting Political Participation Through the Voter
Qualifications Clause of Article I, 56 B.C. L. REV. 159, 207–10 (2015) (discussing courts’
rulings on voter identification laws, and the severity of the states’ burden). Occasionally,
courts strike down a limited burden on voters’ rights. See, e.g., Cotham v. Garza, 905 F. Supp.
389, 391 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (striking down law that prevents voters from bringing personal
notes into the voting booth). Additionally, courts may uphold a substantial burden. See, e.g.,
Nat’l Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Lamb, 202 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1017–20 (W.D.
Mo. 2002), aff’d sub. nom. Nat’l Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Connor, 323 F.3d
684 (8th Cir. 2003) (upholding Missouri law that requires political action committees to
appoint a Missouri resident as treasurer if it intends to spend more than $1500 in a state
election).
230. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191.
231. Id. at 200.
232. Id. at 202 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 (1974)).
233. Id. at 205–08 (Scalia, J., concurring).
234. Id. at 190 n.8 (plurality opinion); see also Justin Levitt, Crawford—More Rhetorical
Bark than Legal Bite?, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 2, 2008), http://www.brennancenter
.org/blog/crawford-more-rhetorical-bark-legal-bite [https://perma.cc/Y6R7-N34M].
235. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 205–06 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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By permitting courts to focus exclusively on the group burdened, Crawford
increased the likelihood that a generally applicable voting regulation would be found
excessively burdensome. After all, if the law only directly impacts a subset of the
voting population, the burdens placed upon that subset are likely to be greater when
considered in isolation than when considered across all voters generally. This, of
course, was of cold comfort to the plaintiffs in Crawford, who failed to garner
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that they had been meaningfully burdened, and
because the state’s fairly generic interests were sufficient to sustain the voter
identification law.236
3. The Democracy Ratchet and Balancing Tests
The Burdick balancing test, as applied in election administration cases in
Crawford, may well have a component that resembles the Democracy Ratchet.237
When considering the “burden” placed upon voters, courts do not evaluate claims in
a vacuum. They are considering the evidence of the things prospective voters must
do before they can vote.
Crawford presents some major opportunities for prospective litigants. First, like
challenges under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, plaintiffs can demonstrate they
are members of a disproportionately affected group, like the group who lacked proper
voter identification established in Crawford. For a group that previously took
advantage of an opportunity no longer available to it because of a change to the
election law, that group can point to the language from Crawford that identifies the
group as the appropriate place to begin an analysis of the Burdick balancing.238

236. See id.
237. I am grateful to several commenters who wondered whether the right to vote as a
“fundamental right” meant that the Democracy Ratchet may have greater salience. I am
reluctant to conclude so. The typical “fundamental” right to vote cases have had the greatest
significance in vote denial or voter eligibility cases, see, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 666–68 (1966); and in “one person, one vote” cases, see, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964). But as Burdick balancing demonstrates, this language of
“fundamental rights” does not appear to have as great a salience in other contexts like ballot
access rules and election administration. And even in other classic “fundamental” right to vote
cases, the Court has been inconsistent. See generally Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to Vote
Really Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143 (2008). For present purposes, I
focus on the existing frameworks the Supreme Court has provided rather than addressing a
“fundamental rights” context—at times, the right to vote may be sufficiently burdened, and
laws so burdening it may be subject to heightened scrutiny. Cf. Richard L. Hasen, The 2012
Voting Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the Resurrection of Bush v. Gore, 81 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1865 (2013).
238. The plurality’s decision in Crawford assuredly does not have binding precedential
value. Six Justices agreed that the proper measure of a burden was on the affected group. See
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 197, 200–03 (plurality opinion); id. at 211–14 (Souter, J., dissenting);
id. at 238–39 (Breyer, J., dissenting). But this holding was not essential to the opinion. The
essential element of the opinion was affirming that the voter identification law was not
sufficiently burdensome, whether the burden was measured via a subset of voters, see id. at
203 (plurality opinion), or measured via voters generally, see id. at 205–07 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment). That is not to say that some courts have not quickly embraced
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Second, plaintiffs have more opportunities to demonstrate the burdens placed
upon them by the “flexible standard” theory of burden. Changes to election laws are
often less onerous than a strict photo identification law like the one adopted in
Crawford,239 which would generally put claimants in a “less onerous” category of
laws, if not the “slight” burden from the Burdick test. A flexible standard, however,
provides a greater opportunity to persuade a court that the law impermissibly burdens
a group of voters.
Third, with a comparative benchmark, courts can look to past practice to
determine the substantiality of the burden. The more people affected by the law, the
greater the impact. The record in a case like Crawford was fairly sparse because the
law had not yet been implemented, and the Court was forced largely to speculate
about the potential burden the identification law would place on voters. In contrast,
a change to an existing law offers more ready evidence for plaintiffs to present about
the burdens they face with the loss of a pre-existing voting practice or procedure.
These are all reasons why litigants might have certain advantages in raising claims
under the Democracy Ratchet. But they do not necessarily mean that the Burdick
balancing test itself embraces a Democracy Ratchet as a substantive element of the
claim. Indeed, Burdick, as used in Crawford, and the practice of the Court in similar
balancing cases, has not done so. And other federal courts in the voter identification
context suggest that the change in the law is not the essential touchstone—or even
something to consider. Voter identification laws, as the Crawford plurality noted,
inevitably “inconvenience” a set of voters, and undoubtedly place a “burden” upon
them. But courts considering voter identification laws seldom consider the burdens
on voters before and after the identification law has been implemented. Instead, they
simply evaluate the nature of the burden placed upon voters in the context of what
they believe to be acceptable, based on the demonstrated record before them. 240
Another complication is that the Burdick balancing test was originally developed
as a kind of safety valve for ballot access laws that blocked minor party political
candidates. It may not be as well-suited for the sprawling election law claims that
they’ve been used for in the last few decades.241 That said, the Burdick balancing test
for ballot access cases has long resisted incorporating a ratchet. The series of cases
discussed above—Rhodes, Jenness, Anderson, and Burdick—each focus exclusively
on the impact of the new law, not a comparison of the new law against the old law. 242

the plurality’s practice. See, e.g., supra Section II.D. But it is to say that it is not controlling
precedent. For more on the best way to understand such a plurality opinion, see Ryan C.
Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and Precedential Constraint, 69 STAN. L.
REV. 795 (2017).
239. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 185–86.
240. See, e.g., id. at 200–02 (addressing facial challenge); see also supra Section II.A.
(discussing pre-enforcement actions challenging new laws).
241. See, e.g., Muller, Ballot Speech, supra note 180, at 721–28 (identifying weaknesses
of extending Burdick balancing test outside the ballot access context).
242. See, e.g., Tripp v. Scholz, 872 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 2017), a routine examination of a
new ballot access law that burdens candidates and political parties. The court’s analysis closely
tracks the Supreme Court’s in measuring the burdens, not comparing the new burden to the
old burden.
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C. Other Causes of Action
The Voting Rights Act and the Burdick balancing test are the two most popular
causes of action that invoke the Democracy Ratchet. But other causes of action,
including a Bush v. Gore-style challenge, are possible sources of challenges.
Courts have occasionally invoked the equal protection claim in Bush v. Gore243
when considering election law-related litigation. I hesitate even to raise Bush v. Gore.
First, one must address the threshold inquiry of whether Bush v. Gore stands for any
broader proposition beyond Florida’s presidential election controversy in 2000.244
Given that the Supreme Court has never cited it in any case in the ensuing eighteen
years except once in a dissenting opinion for a proposition unrelated to its core
holding,245 one might wonder whether it has any applicability in election law cases
going forward.246
But the per curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore did turn on an equal protection issue.
The Court found that the Florida Supreme Court failed to adopt uniformity in a
statewide recount, lacking “some assurance that the rudimentary requirement of
equal treatment and fundamental fairness are satisfied.” 247 A recount based on ad
hoc, county-based recount standards yielded an “arbitrary and disparate treatment to
voters in different counties.”248
The Ohio early voting case expanded this proposition significantly. First, it
applied Bush v. Gore in a case concerning a “burden[] on the fundamental right to
vote” rather than disparate treatment of ballots in a recount. 249 Additionally, Bush v.
Gore was concerned with disparate treatment after Election Day in the context of
that very election—a new change to the recount procedures, adopted after Election
Day and during a recount that had a disparate treatment of different ballots. 250
The Sixth Circuit extended that holding in a somewhat dubious direction:
Moreover, while Bush v. Gore did involve disparate treatment, rather
than burdens on the fundamental right to vote, we nonetheless find its
motivating principle instructive in the present case given that the Equal
Protection Clause can be triggered by either disparate treatment or
burdens. That is, “[h]aving once granted the right to vote on equal
terms”—such as expanding early voting opportunities—“the State may
not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote

243. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
244. See id.
245. See Arizona v. InterTribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 35 n.2 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Bush v. Gore to emphasize the state’s plenary power to choose the manner
of appointing presidential electors, which cited McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892)).
246. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 237.
247. Bush, 531 U.S. at 109 (per curiam).
248. Id. at 107.
249. Ohio State Conf. of NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 542 n.4 (6th Cir. 2014) vacated,
No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014).
250. Bush, 531 U.S. at 100–04 (per curiam).
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over that of another”—for example, by making it substantially harder for
certain groups to vote than others.251
But this cannot be the case. Not every subsequent change to any election law,
particularly to laws that would prospectively apply in subsequent elections, runs
afoul of the equal protection principle in Bush v. Gore. Extending the case from
disparate treatment to voter burdens is one thing. But extending it from a change in
treatment in a single election to a change in treatment across elections is far more
attenuated. It may also be a reason few courts have followed suit to broaden the scope
of application of Bush v. Gore.252
IV. AN EVIDENTIARY AND REMEDIAL DEMOCRACY RATCHET
Litigants, and courts, have begun to adopt the Democracy Ratchet. But, as this
Article has demonstrated, there are good reasons to doubt that any of the major
federal causes of action in election law disputes embrace the Democracy Ratchet. 253
That there are reasons to explain the use of the Democracy Ratchet, or to offer some
basis for tying it to existing legal standards, hardly means that the Democracy
Ratchet is the right tool for courts to use. Therefore, what role (if any) for the
Democracy Ratchet?
This Article offers a modest role for the Democracy Ratchet as an evidentiary
device and a readily available remedy. First, courts still face difficulties assessing the
impact of changes to election laws. They also lack sufficient quantitative evidence to
address the merits of these underlying disputes. And they lack judicially manageable
benchmarks to examine these claims. These all point toward using the Democracy
Ratchet as a useful evidentiary device, a judicially administrable benchmark, and a
readily available remedy.

251. Husted, 768 F.3d at 542 n.4.
252. An alternative approach that might embrace a substantive Democracy Ratchet has
been suggested by Professor Ned Foley. He has argued that the Due Process Clause might be
a better place for these types of claims. He would invite judges to engage in a balancing test,
“weighing the degree to which the change in voting rules upsets reasonably settled
expectations concerning the operation of the voting process against the strength of the
government's nonpartisan reasons for making the change.” Edward B. Foley, Due Process,
Fair Play, and Excessive Partisanship: A New Principle for Judicial Review of Election Laws,
84 U. CHI. L. REV. 655, 741 (2017). Professor Foley’s analysis is an intriguing proposal under
the Due Process Clause and would incorporate a more substantive ratchet. See id. This Article
focuses on how courts have used existing legal claims rather than proposing a new claim as
Professor Foley recommends. But a discussion of whether, and how, to view “vested rights”
under the Due Process Clause is an intriguing theory worthy of serious and ongoing discussion.
Indeed, the expectations of voters may well be a part of a kind of “endowment effect,” as
voters may value opportunities they now have rather than opportunities they never had. Cf.
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment Effect,
Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991). The legal effect of such
expectations, however, is another matter.
253. See supra Part III.
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A. Difficulty Assessing the Likely Impact of a Law
Courts regularly grapple with how to measure the impact of a voting practice
under these substantive legal standards. Courts must generally do their best to
evaluate the prospective impact of a law, hardly a challenge unique to the election
law context. But many judicial struggles likely arise from the fact that the right to
vote, as a political right, never received the kind of judicial protection that today’s
contemporary causes of action provided.
Historically, if one were denied the right to vote, one could sue for damages. 254
The writ quo warranto permitted an election challenger to sue the certified winner
and claim a right to the seat.255 Another remedy might exist in legislatures, both in
Congress and in the states, which have the power to judge the “Elections, Returns
and Qualifications” of its members.256
But courts, beginning in the 1960s and particularly after Baker v. Carr,257
increasingly found themselves fashioning remedies to protect the right to vote.
Congress’s mandate under the Voting Rights Act required courts to assess the
burdens that changes to election laws might have on racial minorities. 258 The broad
judicial development of the freedom of association continue to inject the federal
courts into reviewing the mechanics of elections.259 And Bush v. Gore invited courts
to review even the “nuts and bolts” of election administration. 260 Courts, now tasked
with these new legal responsibilities, began to fashion rules to help them adjudicate
whether the facts surrounding an election law-related controversy would permit
plaintiffs to succeed.
General evidentiary principles arose in these cases. In vote dilution claims under
Section 2, the Supreme Court emphasized that results from several elections are more
probative than a single election.261 A single election might be an outlier—particularly
a midterm election.262 A change to an existing set of election laws, then, offers courts

254. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 283–89 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(describing precedent); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 539 (1927) (describing a damages
action for five thousand dollars against state officer for refusing to permit a citizen to vote).
255. See, e.g., Case Note, Quo Warranto—Scope of Action—Not Available as Writ of
Review, 31 YALE L.J. 662 (1921).
256. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1; see also Joshua A. Douglas, Procedural
Fairness in Election Contests, 88 IND. L.J. 1 (2013); Lisa Marshall Manheim, Judging
Congressional Elections, 51 GA. L. REV. 359 (2017); Derek T. Muller, Scrutinizing Federal
Electoral Qualifications, 90 IND. L.J. 559 (2015); Paul E. Salamanca & James E. Keller, The
Legislative Privilege to Judge the Qualifications, Elections, and Returns of Members, 95 KY.
L.J. 241 (2006).
257. Baker, 369 U.S. 691; see also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)
(concluding that African American voters could raise a constitutional challenge in federal
court to Alabama legislature’s redrawing the city boundaries of Tuskegee to exclude those
voters).
258. See supra Section III.A.
259. See supra Section III.B.
260. See supra Section III.C.
261. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 74–77 (1986).
262. N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 232 (4th Cir. 2016).
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the benefit of looking back at past practice and evaluating the actual number of times
voters took advantage of a previously available election law-related opportunity.
Accordingly, in voter identification litigation, courts have sometimes struggled to
evaluate predictions of future voting behavior and the effect a law may have on
turnout. In voter identification litigation before the Seventh Circuit, Judge Frank
Easterbrook explained, “the parties and the district court have tried to make
predictions about the effects of requiring photo ID, but the predictions cannot be
compared with results.”263 Voter identification litigation, therefore, might typically
explore the projected number of eligible or registered voters who lack the proper
identification, which, in the view of courts evaluating such laws, has been the way
to engage in prospective assessment. 264 Indeed, this is precisely the approach taken
in Crawford.265
B. Insufficient Quantitative Evidence
There are challenges in evaluating changes to election laws. What, then, should
courts do when confronting litigation with a lack of quantitative evidence? Courts
cannot measure whether turnout has changed until after an election (and even then,
isolating causes can still be a challenge). Nevertheless, they do their best to address
the law with the evidentiary record before them, even if it involves some speculation.
The Ninth Circuit identified this precise problem when assessing Arizona’s ballot
harvesting law.266
When invoking the Democracy Ratchet, proponents may be quick to note that
quantitative evidence is not necessary to succeed on the substantive underlying legal
claim. Consider the “totality of the circumstances” test for Section 2.267 Professor
Karlan notes that measuring the turnout effects of a law can be “extraordinarily

263. Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 747 (7th Cir. 2014).
264. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality
opinion); Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2016); Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections,
843 F.3d 592 (4th Cir. 2016); McCrory, 831 F.3d 204; Frank, 768 F.3d 744.
265. See supra Section III.B.2.
266. Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office, 843 F.3d 366, 401 (9th Cir. 2016) (dissent
adopted en banc) (“One cannot statistically test the real world effect of a rule in the abstract;
it can only be measured by actual voting data. In other words, imposition of the district court’s
proposed rule would mean that there could never be a successful pre-election challenge of the
burdens placed on minority voting opportunity because no data will have been generated or
collected.”).
267. See, e.g., Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office, 840 F.3d 1057, 1091 (9th Cir.
2016) (“Although quantitative or statistical measures of comparing minority and white voting
patterns certainly may provide important analytic evidence, the district court erred in
concluding that they were the exclusive means of proof.”); id. at 1092 n.5 (“Likely plaintiffs
could not rely on a vote denial case for the stated proposition because of the practical reality
that in a vote denial case, quantitative evidence of the effect of a rule on voting behavior is
only available after an election has occurred, at which point the remedial purpose of the Voting
Rights Act is no longer served. Plaintiffs in vote dilution cases, in contrast, can often gather
and analyze quantitative data before an election.”).
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complex,” emphasizing that such quantitative evidence “are not a necessary
precondition” under Section 2.268
Such mathematical demonstrations of proof have not been required in vote denial
cases under Section 2 and, more specifically, under Democracy Ratchet cases. And
this is an uncontroversial proposition in Section 2 claims. Professor Tokaji has
emphasized that “context” matters when considering changes to election laws. 269 As
he has argued, “Where a state goes from a more permissive voting rule to a stricter
one, plaintiffs will naturally be in a better position to show that the disparate impact
could be avoided by a different practice: namely, by introducing evidence on the
effect of the practice in effect beforehand.”270 And Professor Karlan has emphasized
that changes to election laws should carry some “evidentiary weight.” 271 It is useful
evidence, to be sure—and far from a quantitative evidentiary requirement.
C. Lack of Superior Alternative Judicially-Manageable Benchmarks
Even if there is little quantitative evidence, courts still must determine whether a
state’s law impermissibly burdens voters. Indeed, courts often lack quantitative
evidence. Courts must turn to other measures to determine whether, and how much,
a law burdens voters. And it may be the case that courts and litigants simply lack
superior alternative benchmarks for measuring the burden placed on the right to vote,
or that they are unwilling to posit alternative benchmarks. That is, it may be the case
that the very best evidence at judges’ disposal is to compare the new law against the
old law and engage in an analysis about the relative change in burden.
Courts have been willing to inject themselves into disputes concerning the right
to vote, and they have readily assessed burdens placed upon that right with a
judicially developed standard, but one often readily easy to administer. Consider
“one person, one vote,” a judicial doctrine arising out of the redistricting litigation of
the 1960s.272 The Court’s requirement in Reynolds v. Sims that districts include equal
population did not include much guidance about what equal meant. 273 Over the last
sixty years, the Court has ultimately settled that deviations of up to ten percent
between the most populous and least populous districts in a state legislative system
are usually permissible,274 although larger deviations have been considered
acceptable.275 In congressional restricting, the Court has typically required something

268. Karlan, Getting Results, supra note 150, at 712–15.
269. See supra notes 145–149 and accompanying text.
270. Tokaji, Applying Section 2, supra note 145, at 478.
271. See supra notes 150–155 and accompanying text.
272. See generally Muller, One Person, One Vote, supra note 185.
273. 377 U.S. 533, 576 (1964).
274. See, e.g., Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1307 (2016)
(“[T]hose attacking a state-approved plan must show that it is more probable than not that a
deviation of less than 10% reflects the predominance of illegitimate reapportionment factors .
. . .”).
275. See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 161 (1993); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S.
315, 328 (1973).

488

I N DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 94:451

close to precise mathematical equality. 276 These have provided fairly administrable
benchmarks for judicial review.
Or consider the judicial determination that a new majority-minority district ought
to be drawn pursuant to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.277 There have been
mathematical rules—with some precision—required for a plaintiff to succeed on a
vote dilution claim under Section 2. Consider Thornburg v. Gingles, which
established the “necessary preconditions” for minority voters as a group to establish
a single-member district.278 Faced with the generic language of Section 2, the Court
developed a test to determine whether a group has “less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice.”279 This Article addressed the contours of this test
earlier.280 The group must be “sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute a majority,”281 which has meant a voting population exceeding fifty
percent,282 and a geographic compactness that has precluded a district with a “300mile gap” between racial minority communities. 283 The group must demonstrate that
it is “politically cohesive,”284 where, for instance, “anywhere from 49% to 67% of
the members of a minority group preferred the same candidate.”285 And the group
must demonstrate that the “white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—
in the absence of special circumstances, . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred
candidate.”286 The Court was comfortable requiring some history of support before
moving ahead under a typical Section 2 vote dilution claim.
Or consider the whole line of ballot access cases, where a court makes a judgment
that a particular signature requirement is or is not unduly burdensome.287 Courts look
to the objective burdens placed upon independent and minor-party candidates, not
the relative change in burden.288
Just because courts are willing (or, in the case of the Voting Rights Act, mandated
by Congress) to enter the political fray, does not necessarily mean remedies are so
easily available. Having entered the thicket, courts have been more reluctant to
fashion remedies that stray too far from a couple of hallmarks: readily available
evidence that judges can evaluate, and remedial actions grounded in something

276. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 727 (1983); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S.
783, 790–92 (1973); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530–31 (1969).
277. See supra Section III.A.
278. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
279. Id. at 36.
280. See supra Section III.A.2.
281. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50.
282. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 18–20 (2009).
283. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 432 (2006).
284. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51.
285. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 904 n.12 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing
Citizens for a Better Gretna v. Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 501–02 (5th Cir. 1987)).
286. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51.
287. See supra Section III.B.
288. See, e.g., Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 198 (1986) (examining the
burden placed on Socialist Workers Party candidate as a result of a new law, but not comparing
the burden to the prior state of the burden); Breck v. Stapleton, 259 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 1131
(D. Mont. 2017); see also supra notes 240–242 and accompanying text.

2019]

THE DE M O CRA C Y RA T CH ET

489

tethered to that evidence. Past voting behavior and other readily discernible evidence
are valuable to courts in election law cases.
Perhaps, too, there are worries about courts developing their own standards in
areas where they lack guidance, either because the statute is open-ended or they are
applying a test derived from a construction of the Constitution. And in this respect,
the Democracy Ratchet has the emphatic virtue of the ease of administration.289 It
allows judges to perform a smaller task: they simply compare the old standard to the
new standard, without referring to any other more abstract standard about what the
“right to vote” looks like.
The legal standards from the Court are notoriously uncertain, anyway. For the
Burdick balancing test, when is a burden on the right “slight,” “substantial,” or
“severe”? Section 2’s “totality of the circumstances” includes a laundry list of factors
from a Senate report and a fairly substantial amount of judicial discretion. Professor
Christopher Elmendorf has even gone so far as to call Section 2 a common law grant
of power to federal courts. 290
A comparison of the burdens between the old law and the new law provides an
anchor for judges, litigants, and legislatures. And the change of law does seem to be
a relevant factor—new laws should be examined in context. And while this factor
may blend in with the absence of evidence,291 it’s really a factor closer to judicial
administration.
D. A Remedial Ratchet
Finally, the Democracy Ratchet offers courts a benefit beyond its evidentiary
function. It provides courts with a readily available remedy—the existing standard.
If a new law is found to impermissibly lessen opportunities for voters or
inappropriately burden voters, a court must fashion a remedy. And reverting to the
preexisting law offers a readily available remedy.
This slightly diverges from the descriptive reason cited earlier in the preliminary
injunction standard. There, courts used the preexisting standard as a justification for
preserving the status quo in election law cases. 292 But when fashioning a remedy on
the merits of the underlying claim, such as issuing a permanent injunction, courts can
easily return to the preexisting state of the law.
Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing how narrow the Democracy Ratchet looks
here. In a dispute over an election law, the remedy would be to enjoin that statute
generally or sever portions of the statute. That could be the case in voter identification
law cases, when a court might enjoin application of the statute. But in other contexts,
legislators might need to scramble for solutions to fill a void, or it might put the court
in a position to determine what law should govern an election if it finds that an
election law impermissibly burdens voters. And in the Arizona voting rights case,
enjoining the statute would provide an identical solution to returning to the
benchmark of the preexisting statute. But in some other cases, like determining how

289.
290.
291.
292.

Pitts, supra note 100, at 757.
Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2, supra note 112, at 384.
See supra Section IV.A.
See supra Section II.B.
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Florida voters might be able to cure signatures on absentee ballots, there is no readily
available solution if the statute is enjoined. Returning to the preexisting statute might
be appropriate in such cases.
E. An Example: Pasadena, Texas Voting Districts, 2017
The Democracy Ratchet can serve these evidentiary and remedial functions with
little effort. Indeed, in the Pasadena, Texas voting rights litigation, it worked quite
well. But it was not included among the Democracy Ratchet examples above because
the change was not a component of the substantive legal claim or very much of a
consideration at all.
Voters in the city of Pasadena, Texas chose members of its city council from eight
single-member districts.293 In 2014, the city changed this plan to six single-member
districts and two at-large districts.294 Plaintiffs challenged the redistricting plan under
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 295
The district court explained that Latinos had the opportunity to elect four of the
eight seats under the old plan, but “[t]he change to Pasadena’s voting map and plan
drops Latinos’ proportional opportunity” to three out of eight districts. 296 It
concluded that “reversion” to the previous system “was necessary to cure the dilution
of Latino votes.”297 The court also went on under a separate Equal Protection claim
to find that the city had engaged in intentional discrimination in passing the law. 298
But note that the court here barely needed the change as a component of its
analysis. It simply evaluated Latino voting strength to indicate that four singlemember districts should be drawn for Latino voters.299 Whether the map was the
result of a change or a long-standing practice, the result from the court would have
been the same. But it helped, as an evidentiary matter, that the court could look to
the past practice of Latino voters across eight single-member districts to evaluate
Latino voting power. Additionally, the court did not need to fashion new maps for a
remedy. It could easily revert to the old maps, which ensured that Latino voters
would have the opportunity to elect members in four districts.300
Of course, past election results are necessary to succeed in a Section 2 vote
dilution claim.301 They can certainly be useful for Burdick claims.302 But while past

293. Patino v. City of Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667, 673 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
294. Id. at 674.
295. Id. at 675.
296. Id. at 712.
297. Patino v. City of Pasadena, 229 F. Supp. 3d 582, 588 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
298. Patino, 230 F. Supp. 3d at 724–28.
299. Id. at 725.
300. Id. at 729.
301. See supra note 279 and accompanying text (noting that past voting practices of racial
groups are necessary to demonstrate success under Section 2); see also Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30, 57 (1986) (“Because loss of political power through vote dilution is distinct from
the mere inability to win a particular election, a pattern of racial bloc voting that extends over
a period of time is more probative of a claim that a district experiences legally significant
polarization than are the results of a single election.” (citation omitted)).
302. See supra note 288.
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election results may not be necessary under vote denial claims, they could certainly
be useful for courts examining whether a voting law deprives voters of their equal
opportunity to participate in the political process, or to substantially burden their
right to vote.
V. REFINING THE DEMOCRACY RATCHET
The Democracy Ratchet is not a component of any of the existing legal causes of
action for typical election law litigation. But it may be a valuable evidentiary device
that can be persuasive to courts considering changes to election laws, and it can
provide a judicially manageable benchmark for issuing a remedy.
That said, the Democracy Ratchet should be refined so that it can operate with
greater precision. Courts in these cases have too quickly dismissed the substance of
the causes of action they are tasked with enforcing when they invoke the Democracy
Ratchet. They must ensure that the existing burdens of persuasion remain as
substantive law has required, even in Democracy Ratchet cases. And they should
recognize the costs to election laws and legislative experimentation that considers
such costs, often imperfectly.
A. Considering Alternative Opportunities
There is a risk of overstating the severity of the burden placed on the right to vote
when it comes to applying the Democracy Ratchet in the causes of action listed
above. When a previously available voting practice or procedure is abolished, the
relative burden on some voters has undoubtedly increased. But has it really added a
burden that rises to the level of a legally cognizable injury?
Consider voter identification laws. Despite soaring rhetoric about the impact of
voter identification requirements, political science literature has revealed that in most
jurisdictions, these laws have little if any impact on voter turnout, at least as studied
so far.303 And when the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Indiana’s

303. Michael D. Gilbert, The Problem of Voter Fraud, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 739, 749
(2015); Benjamin Highton, Voter Identification Laws and Turnout in the United States, 20
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 149, 164 (2017); M.V. Hood III & Charles S. Bullock III, Much Ado
About Nothing? An Empirical Assessment of the Georgia Voter Identification Statute, 12 ST.
POL. & POL’Y Q. 394, 409 (2012) (finding a decline in turnout by 0.4 percentage points in 2008
election but no empirical evidence that there was a racial or ethnic component to the
suppression effect); Nicholas A. Valentino & Fabian G. Neuner, Why the Sky Didn’t Fall:
Mobilizing Anger in Reaction to Voter ID Laws, 38 POL. PSYCHOL. 331, 347 (2017)
(concluding that empirical evidence for decline in voter turnout after implementation of voter
identification laws has been lacking and arguing that any increase of disenfranchisement
among Democratic voters has been offset by mobilization efforts). See generally Robert S.
Erikson & Lorraine C. Minnite, Modeling Problems in the Voter Identification—Voter
Turnout Debate, 8 ELECTION L.J. 85, 98 (2009) (“We should be wary of claims—from all sides
of the controversy—regarding turnout effects from voter ID laws.”); Allison Orr Larsen,
Constitutional Law in an Age of Alternative Facts, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 175, 193–215 (2018)
(describing empirical deficiencies among proponents and opponents of voter identification
laws).
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voter identification law in Crawford, it concluded that a mere “inconvenience” has
not been considered a “substantial” burden according to the Crawford plurality.304
But the Crawford plurality’s decision to measure the impact only on the group
directly affected by the law looked at a subset of the total population—and increased
the likelihood of finding a substantial burden. 305 A generally applicable law, like a
new voter identification law, will ordinarily affect only a subset of the population,
and often a small subset at that, meaning the overall burden is quite low.306 That’s
the case for early voting opportunities in Ohio or ballot harvesting in Arizona. To
demonstrate the burden, then, voters must not simply assert they would have used
the previously available voting device, such as early voting or ballot delivery
mechanisms. They must demonstrate that they were sufficiently burdened. But it is
not enough for a litigant to insist that she took advantage of an opportunity that is no
longer available; courts must look at alternative voting practices or procedures in
determining the scope of the burden on the right to vote.
Alternative opportunities are not always sufficient for voters, but they are
necessarily a part of the inquiry, regardless of the cause of action. Courts may
conclude that alternative means are so materially different from a candidate
appearing on the ballot that they are not treated as adequate alternative opportunities.
In Jenness,307 voters could engage in a variety of political activities, but the Court
found the inability to associate by means of the ballot meant that alternative
opportunities were insufficient.308 The Supreme Court has found that write-in voting
opportunities are not an adequate substitute for a candidate’s name appearing in print
on the ballot.309 In contrast, in Burdick,310 the lack of write-in access was not fatal to
Hawaii’s ballot access law.311 Ample adequate alternative means existed for
candidates and voters to associate with one another, even if the preferred means of a
write-in candidacy was unavailable.312
For Section 2 claims, the burden is measured in terms of the opportunities
available to a protected group. But even in striking down North Carolina’s voter
identification law, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that “it cannot be that states must
forever tip-toe around certain voting provisions disproportionately used by
minorities.”313 The burden, the Fourth Circuit reasoned, cannot arise just because a
practice has been used by a particular group. Instead, it must be the case that the

304. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 198 (2008) (plurality opinion).
305. But see supra note 238 (describing judgment in this plurality opinion).
306. See, e.g., Derek T. Muller, What’s Old Is New Again: The Nineteenth Century Voter
Registration Debates and Lessons About Voter Identification Disputes, 56 WASHBURN L.J.
109 (2017); Timothy Vercellotti & David Andersen, Voter-Identification Requirements and
the Learning Curve, 42 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 117 (2009).
307. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
308. See supra notes 201–206 and accompanying text.
309. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 799 n.26 (1983); Lubin v. Panish,
415 U.S. 709, 719 n.5 (1974).
310. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
311. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
313. N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 241 (4th Cir. 2016); see also
Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 843 F.3d 592, 601 (4th Cir. 2016).

2019]

THE DE M O CRA C Y RA T CH ET

493

group now has less opportunity than others, considering the “totality of the
circumstances”—and that includes a demonstration of the burdens placed upon that
group in pursuing other existing opportunities.314
To succeed under a Section 2 claim, litigants must demonstrate that they have
“less opportunity.”315 The inquiry is not whether they have “fewer opportunities”
—assuredly a tempting gloss on the text when the Democracy Ratchet is in play.
After all, eliminating a previously available voting opportunity would certainly
present one fewer opportunity, and a court might easily elide over the text of the
statute when concluding that this alone means that the litigant has proved that the
change rises to a Section 2 violation. But it is one unsupported by the text of the
statute, and it is one that is not a substantive part of the statute, anyway. 316
Here, perhaps, is simply a question of where the law ought to place the burden of
persuasion. Typically, a challenger to a duly-enacted law would need to come
forward with some quantum of evidence to demonstrate that the law ran afoul of the
right to vote—the character and magnitude of the burden in Burdick, or that the voter
had “less opportunity” to participate under Section 2. Under Section 2, if voters
cannot avail themselves of alternative means of voting, such as voting on a different
early voting day or finding a relative to collect their absentee ballot, then they might
have “less opportunity.” If the elimination of once-available opportunities materially
burdened them, it might run afoul of Burdick. The Democracy Ratchet would simply
be a useful tool to demonstrate voting opportunities and participation in the political
process. The state altering those opportunities doesn’t mean the plaintiffs win. It
simply means plaintiffs can start at past practice in making their claims.
B. Retaining Burdens of Persuasion
The Democracy Ratchet is best understood as a limited tool of evidence and
remedy, and its presence does not mean a challenger has presumptively demonstrated
that the election law has impermissibly burdened their right to vote. The Democracy
Ratchet does not alleviate responsibility of demonstrating that burden.
Proponents of a strong Democracy Ratchet might presume that litigants have
demonstrated an impermissible burden because of the change. That would require a
greater showing from the state to overcome that assumed burden. Plaintiffs need not
present quantitative evidence to demonstrate a burden,317 but this presumption might
require substantial evidence, perhaps quantitative, to defend the law. Even assuming
that one could collect the data, it becomes even more challenging for the state to
establish that the burdened group would take advantage of (non-burden or lowburden) alternative avenues—wholly the stuff of projection. The state, therefore,
would have a significant evidentiary burden to meet if there is thin evidence of a
demonstrated quantifiable impact and a preexisting expectation that a once-available
voting practice or procedure should continue to remain in place.

314.
315.
316.
317.

McCrory, 831 F.3d at 233.
Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012 & Supp. 2017).
See supra Section III.A.5.
See supra Section III.A.5.
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Courts must carefully consider the Democracy Ratchet and avoid drifting into a
strong version that alters the burdens of persuasion. The substantive law is not
affected when the challenged voting practice or procedure stems from a recent
change. It simply may be easier for plaintiffs to demonstrate that they have been
impermissibly burdened.
To that end, the state legislature need not demonstrate some higher burden of
proof justifying the change, nor does the burden shift to the state to justify the change.
The evidentiary weight of the change—when properly understood in the context of
all available voting opportunities318—is simply more persuasive when litigants can
point to concrete instances of past exercise of those opportunities.
This is not unlike the Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Communications
Commission v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.319 The FCC had long determined that
isolated or fleeting broadcast expletives were not indecent and would not lead to
enforcement against networks airing such incidents. 320 But the FCC changed its
position over time, and by 2004 declared that a single fleeting expletive might rise
to the level of indecent language subject to an enforcement action.321 The Supreme
Court affirmed the Agency’s power to change its mind, and that such a change was
not subject to “heightened” review under the Administrative Procedure Act. 322 The
Agency still needed to provide a reasoned explanation for its decision, but it did not
need to explain that its new position was better than the old one.323 While only an
analogous case under the Administrative Procedure Act, it is instructive when
considering how changes to election laws should be evaluated. Unlike Section 5
claims, where the burden was expressly on the enacting jurisdiction to justify the
change, these substantive claims require no such additional justification or
heightened scrutiny. While the Democracy Ratchet may not require greater
justifications from the state, it will inevitably require some countervailing evidence
when litigation arises.
C. Ensuring Symmetrical Treatment of Election Laws
Of course, it may well be the case that there is simply an irreconcilable conflict
of views over legislative power and voting laws, complicated by these open-ended
legal standards. One view is a symmetrical approach: voting laws are like just about
any other kind of law—as a matter of policy and acting within certain acceptable
boundaries, the legislature can expand or contract voting opportunities as it deems
appropriate, every time subject to external constraints on its power to burden the
“right to vote.” The other view is an asymmetrical approach: contraction of
opportunities ought to be scrutinized with greater skepticism. That asymmetrical
approach provides the initial framework for the Democracy Ratchet.
This asymmetry has drawn some concern in lower courts. Ninth Circuit Judge Jay
Bybee wondered how Arizona’s decision to limit ballot harvesting might comport

318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

See supra Section V.A.
556 U.S. 502 (2009).
Id. at 517–20.
Id. at 508–10.
Id. at 514.
Id. at 515.
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with the fact that ballot harvesting is prohibited in a number of states.324 The choice
is a challenging one: identical provisions rise and fall together across the country; or
identical provisions are treated differently in each jurisdiction.
It is worth pausing to reflect on two types of asymmetry. The first is asymmetry
in how courts scrutinize changes to election laws. This Article has argued that courts
cannot substantively incorporate a non-retrogression principle into existing legal
doctrines. Judicial scrutiny of changes to election laws looks the same whether the
law is longstanding or of recent vintage. But the evidence available to parties looks
different in the context of the Democracy Ratchet.
The second is asymmetry in voting rights across jurisdictions. That arises in the
opening hypothetical: one state has ample early voting, the other has none. Voting
rights opportunities look different across jurisdictions.
There are good reasons to think that the Voting Rights Act and Burdick ought to
differ across jurisdictions, and not simply for the pragmatic reasons listed above. To
begin, the Constitution assumes that the right to vote will vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. The right to vote for members of the House turns on each state’s
qualifications to vote for the most numerous branch of the state legislature.325 The
same for voting for members of the Senate.326 The times, places, and manner of
elections will vary by state unless Congress standardizes it. 327 The opportunity to
choose presidential electors depends on state law.328 The American system of
elections is built upon an expectation that the right to vote varies across jurisdictions.
The burdens places upon voters are context specific, dependent upon the evidence
in each jurisdiction. Professor Tokaji has noted that context can, in fact, vary from
state to state:
In one state, for example, in-person early voting may be very important
for racial minorities, while another state may not choose to offer it at all.
A much higher percentage of racial minorities may have qualifying voter
ID in one state than another. The same holds true of registration rules,
provisional ballots, and virtually all other elements of a state’s system. It
follows that the effect of a change in election rules in one state may be
very different from the effect of a similar-looking change in a different
state.329
Courts are invited to examine the particular burdens in a jurisdiction, and the burdens
may vary from state to state—no different from the fact that the right to vote itself
may vary from state to state. Section 2 vote dilution claims may vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction depending on evidence of voter behavior. 330

324. Feldman v. Ariz. Sec’y of State’s Office, 843 F.3d 366, 414 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(Bybee, J., dissenting) (“Unless the Voting Rights Act means that identical provisions are
permissible in some states and impermissible on other states, our decision would invalidate
many of those provisions, including provisions in other states of the Ninth Circuit.”).
325. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
326. Id. amend. XVII.
327. Id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
328. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
329. Tokaji, Applying Section 2, supra note 145, at 483 (citations omitted).
330. There is an imperfect analogy to Shelby County. There, the Court emphasized that
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It may well be the case that the absence of early voting opportunities is an
impermissible burden; it could also be the case that eliminating a previously available
opportunity is the same. Or, the long-absent opportunity and the recently-altered
opportunity pose no impermissible burdens. The baselines simply differ across
jurisdictions depending on the context of the right to vote in that jurisdiction. That
may be cold comfort to those who desire greater uniformity in our election system,
but asymmetry is inevitable when it comes to the right to vote as long as it is
principally administered by the states.
D. Evaluating Costs in the Overall Electoral System
Courts uncritically accepting Democracy Ratchet may give short shrift to the costs
that new and expanded voting opportunities offer—costs that may appear
counterintuitive without careful examination. Conventional wisdom suggests that
more opportunities to participate in the political process are invariably good. And the
Democracy Ratchet in its present form tends to prefer the status quo of more
opportunities over a change that reduces opportunities. 331 But political science data
shows a decidedly mixed portrait of some of these expanded opportunities.
For instance, early voting opportunities spread out the election process over a
series of weeks, and an early-voting electorate may not have all of the information
that the electorate has on Election Day. Late information affects the political process,
and legislatures might prefer for voters to vote when they have the most
information.332 Late-breaking information might affect voter behavior. 333 Candidates
who drop out of a race, especially a presidential primary, might yield early “wasted”
votes.334 Perhaps there are better legislative solutions than limiting early voting
opportunities. Instant runoff voting might be the preferable option. 335 Political

states were entitled to “equal sovereignty”; that is, the states are “equal in power, dignity and
authority.” Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 544 (2013) (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221
U.S. 559, 567 (1911)). The states each have the opportunity and ability to pass similar laws.
But, of course, the application of a similar law can have a different impact in one jurisdiction
over another, or a similar law may be motivated by improper animus in one jurisdiction but
enacted legitimately in another.
331. See supra Part II.
332. Eugene Kontorovich & John McGinnis, The Case Against Early Voting, POLITICO
MAG. (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/01/early-voting-the
-case-against-102748 [https://perma.cc/B3PE-HKAB].
333. See, e.g., Politico Staff, Full Text: FBI Letter Announcing New Clinton Review,
POLITICO (Oct. 28, 2016, 3:23 PM) http://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/full-text-fbi-letter
-announcing-new-clinton-review-230463 [https://perma.cc/R8QM-BQXE]; Transcript:
Donald Trump’s Taped Comments About Women, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/us/donald-trump-tape-transcript.html?_r=0
[https://
perma.cc/HNU3-7KCV].
334. Randy Yeip, The Impact of ‘Wasted’ Votes in the Presidential Race — Chart, WALL
ST. J.: WASH. WIRE (Mar. 29, 2016, 11:20 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/03/29
/the-impact-of-wasted-votes-in-the-presidential-race-chart [https://perma.cc/EKJ3-U8GL].
335. See, e.g., Dudum v. Arntz, 640 F.3d 1098, 1117 (9th Cir. 2011) (approving use of
instant runoff voting in San Francisco); Edward B. Foley, Third-Party and Independent
Presidential Candidates: The Need for a Runoff Mechanism, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 993 (2016).
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science literature tends to show that early voters are among the most partisan voters
who are highly reliable in their preferred candidate and unlikely to change their vote
based on late-breaking information, so perhaps such concerns are overstated.336 Early
voting may not even advantage groups of voters in ways that partisan legislatures
anticipate.337 Further, perhaps these concerns are most problematic with presidential
primaries, the circumstance where candidates are unusually likely to drop out before
an election.
There is mixed evidence about the benefits of other voting practices and
procedures, too. There is some evidence supporting the argument that early voting
actually decreases turnout,338 or at least does not affect turnout as much as one might
anticipate.339 Basic financial cost issues, simplistic as they may be, would also drive
marginal legislative decisions.340
The Democracy Ratchet best functions as a useful tool of evidence and a readily
available remedy. But it cannot supplant broad examination of all the evidence,
including critical—even generalized—evidence that may run counter to the court’s
intuitions.341
In the cases that have invoked the Democracy Ratchet, perhaps the plaintiffs
simply amassed more evidence and were more persuasive, 342 particularly in
situations where the courts addressed the evidence under a preliminary injunction
standard.343 This Article does not attempt to parse the evidentiary records developed
in each of the cases identified in Part I. But in each case, it would provide more
deference to legislative judgments in these areas, particularly in areas with limited
empirical evidence. While the justifications for the change may be tenuous, they may
be no more tenuous than the justifications for expanding the voting practices or
procedures in the first place. Fairly generalized evidence might be enough for the
state to meet its burden of justifying the law. 344 Indeed, state-specific evidence may

336. See, e.g., Barry C. Burden, David T. Canon, Kenneth R. Mayer & Donald P.
Moynihan, The Complicated Partisan Effects of State Election Laws, 70 POL. RES. Q. 564, 565
(2017) (“[I]n practice most conveniences are better at ‘retaining’ likely voters than bringing
out new voters.”).
337. See, e.g., id. at 566 (“[S]everal studies now cast doubt on the idea that early voting
stimulates turnout.”).
338. See, e.g., Barry C. Burden, David T. Canon, Kenneth R. Mayer & Donald P.
Moynihan, Election Laws, Mobilization, and Turnout: The Unanticipated Consequences of
Election Reform, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 95 (2014).
339. See, e.g., Craig Leonard Brians & Bernard Grofman, Election Day Registration’s
Effect on U.S. Voter Turnout, 82 SOC. SCI. Q. 170 (2001).
340. It’s worth noting that these are not “cost” claims of the type that we need to make
voting a little harder (to speak colloquially) so that only people with “skin in the game”
participate in the political process. It simply means that routine finances of the states, including
staffing, transportation, printing, and error correction, are inevitably a part of any election law
calculus.
341. See, e.g., supra notes 239–240 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court’s decision to accept state legislature’s generalized evidence in Crawford).
342. See supra Part I.
343. See supra Section II.B.
344. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 194–96 (2008)
(plurality opinion) (admitting that record had “no evidence of any such fraud actually
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be a challenge to obtain—much less any evidence in short-fuse election litigation
over a law whose impact is quite unknown.
Measurement of election participation may conceal the effects of the law.
Consider the hypothetical voter identification law that bolsters turnout for those who
have gained confidence under this new fraud-preventing law,345 but that reduces
turnout for others who lack the form of identification or are discouraged because they
believe (rightly or wrongly) that they lack the proper form of identification. 346 The
best ways to measure the impact of voter identification laws remains deeply
unsettled.347
Litigants may rightly respond that if evidence has been introduced demonstrating
that the law burdens minority voters and interacts with social and historical
conditions, that should be good enough under Section 2; if it removes an opportunity
some voters once used, that should be good enough to demonstrate a substantial
burden under Burdick that requires more persuasive justification from the state. But
as cold as it may sound, voters need not be guaranteed the right to exercise the most
convenient voting practices and procedures. That is, neither Section 2 nor the Burdick
balancing test requires that. Maximum voting convenience may be a desirable policy
goal for some, but it is not the stuff of present election law claims.
E. Recognizing Legislative Experimentation
As a simple matter of incentives, a more modest Democracy Ratchet permits
greater leeway for legislatures to experiment. State legislatures could experiment
with expanding new voting opportunities, then contracting them later, with little
justification for either the expansion or the contraction. After all, it is a fairly costless
decision for the legislature to decide to experiment and create new and different
voting opportunities. If a strong Democracy Ratchet prevents states from contracting
opportunities later, however, state legislatures may choose not to expand in the first
place. Limiting the Democracy Ratchet to an evidentiary and remedial function
would prevent this disincentive.

occurring in Indiana at any time in its history,” but citing evidence around the country and a
legitimate “risk of voter fraud” as a legitimate state interest).
345. See Jack Citrin, Donald P. Green & Morris Levy, The Effects of Voter ID Notification
on Voter Turnout: Results from a Large-Scale Field Experiment, 13 ELECTION L.J. 228 (2014).
But see Charles Stewart III, Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Revisiting Public
Opinion on Voter Identification and Voter Fraud in an Era of Increasing Partisan
Polarization, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1455 (2016).
346. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
347. Compare Justin Grimmer, Eitan Hersh, Marc Meredith, Jonathan Mummolo &
Clayton Nall, Obstacles to Estimating Voter ID Laws’ Effect on Turnout, 80 J. POL. 1045
(2018), https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/696618 [https://perma.cc
/AKB5-B47A], with Zoltan Hajnal, John Kuk & Nazita Lajevardi, We All Agree: Strict Voter
ID Laws Disproportionately Burden Minorities, 80 J. POL. 1052 (2018), https://www
.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/696617 [https://perma.cc/3ZES-Q6NE], and
Barry C. Burden, Disagreement Over ID Requirements and Minority Voter Turnout, 80 J. POL.
1060 (2018), https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/696616 [https://perma
.cc/MS2K-DEWM].
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But one wonders how persuasive this justification may be. It remains deeply
unsettled whether legislatures heed the judiciary very closely, if at all, when
considering new legislation.348 That said, preclearance under Section 5 emphatically
did alter legislative behavior—legislatures knew that every election law would need
preclearance, and legislatures tailored legislation as a result. 349 Additionally, a more
robust Democracy Ratchet might simply demand that the legislature come forward
with reasons for narrowing opportunities—even if the state needed no reasons to
expand those opportunities. Without rehashing the earlier discussion, 350 existing laws
in a post–Shelby County world anticipate symmetrical treatment of state election
laws.
CONCLUSION
Challenges to laws that eliminate or alter voting procedures or practices will
continue to fill judicial dockets. We are entering a time of greater single-party
partisan control of state legislatures and governor’s mansions than at any point in
recent history;351 an uptick in election law-related litigation;352 and renewed concern
of fraud (actual or perceived), from illegal voting to hacking election systems. 353
New legislation is always forthcoming.

348. See, e.g., Kathy Canfield-Davis, Sachin Jain, Don Wattam, Jerry McMurtry & Mike
Johnson, Factors of Influence on Legislative Decision Making: A Descriptive Study – Updated
August 2009, 13 J. LEGAL ETHICAL & REG. ISSUES 55, 58–59 (2010) (identifying eighteen
factors that appear to have any material influence on legislators in a single state case study,
none of which concern the judiciary); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck,
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,
Delegation and the Cannons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 773 (2014) (“[Congress] viewed
courts, at best, as interpreters of ‘last resort’—or worse, as interpreters whom Congress does
not even think about or whose input was unwelcome.”).
349. See, e.g., South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30, 53 (D.D.C. 2012)
(Bates, J., concurring) (noting comments of state legislatures tailoring South Carolina’s voter
identification law to ensure that the law would be precleared under Section 5).
350. See supra Section V.C.
351. Haeyoun Park, Jeremy Ashkenas & Mike Bostock, Taking the Battle to the States,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/01/11/us/politics
/who-controls-the-states-and-where-they-stand.html
[https://perma.cc/Q6SM-RTEM]
(“Republicans or Democrats have single-party control of both the legislature and the
governor’s office in 36 states, the most in six decades.”).
352. See generally RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE
NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN 131–57 (2012) (describing increased litigation in election law
disputes).
353. See Derek T. Muller, Three Divergent Election-Law Decisions in the Early Trump
Administration, U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE (Apr. 29, 2017), https://illinoislawreview
.org/symposium/first-100-days/three-divergent-election-law-decisions-in-the-early-trump
-administration [https://perma.cc/8HJZ-76Y2] (describing efforts of the now-defunct
Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity); see also Presidential Advisory
Commission on Election Integrity, WHITE HOUSE (July 13, 2017), https://www
.whitehouse.gov/articles/presidential-advisory-commission-election-integrity/ [https://perma
.cc/88QP-2D2S].
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Courts and litigants have turned to the Democracy Ratchet under a variety of legal
theories. It offers a fairly stable benchmark for courts to consider the impact of a new
law, and it allows litigants to preserve existing voting practices or procedures that
they prefer. But the theory, while descriptive in practice, has lacked a sufficient basis
in the text of the Constitution, federal statutes, or judicial precedent. There is some
support for a version of the Democracy Ratchet in Section 2 litigation—particularly
when the legislature’s justification is tenuous, the practice interacts with social and
historical conditions, and minority voters demonstrate that they have less opportunity
than other voters because of the change in the law. The same holds true in the Burdick
balancing test—eliminating a previously available voting practice or procedure may
result in a substantial burden being placed upon the voters.
But a strong Democracy Ratchet that incorporates a kind of non-retrogression
analysis into Section 2, or one that elevates the Burdick balancing test into something
of similar strength, lacks a legal basis—indeed, it may overstate the burdens on voters
and unnecessarily limit legislatures. Instead, the Democracy Ratchet is best
understood as providing two limited functions for courts. First, it enables them to
more readily rely upon the evidence presented by litigants who can demonstrate
actual past use of the procedure. Second, if the court finds that the practice does run
afoul of a substantive claim, the court can readily revert to the past practice.
Perhaps354 the Democracy Ratchet will put state legislatures on notice to develop
a more robust record for any change to election laws. And maybe that’s the necessary
trade-off—voters can’t afford the loss of opportunities because of the incalculable
nature of them, and our instincts are that we simply conclude that more opportunities
are better than fewer opportunities. But policy instincts are different than substantive
legal claims, and the Democracy Ratchet ought to function, and can function
effectively, in its limited role as an evidentiary device and a readily available remedy.

354. This Article has included the word “perhaps” more than a dozen times. That is far
more uncertainty than the Author would prefer to include in an academic piece like this one.
But it reflects the open questions surrounding how courts have gone about using the
Democracy Ratchet, and the highly fact-specific context in individual cases that have led to
superficial inconsistencies among jurisdictions. Without quantitative evidence, given frequent
legislative innovation, and with deeply uncertain ability to isolate the precise impacts of any
changes to election laws, some uncertainty is inevitable.

